{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-71886", "assignerOrgId": "91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "bcorg", "dateReserved": "2026-08-08T00:06:06.982Z", "datePublished": "2026-10-03T08:46:33.868Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-05T16:03:23.403Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630", "shortName": "bcorg", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-03T08:46:33.868Z"}, "title": "OpenPGP certification accepted from a subkey without certification authority", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "cweId": "CWE-863", "description": "CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization", "type": "CWE"}, {"lang": "en", "cweId": "CWE-285", "description": "CWE-285 Improper Authorization", "type": "CWE"}]}], "affected": [{"vendor": "Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.", "product": "BC-JAVA", "platforms": ["all"], "collectionURL": "https://www.bouncycastle.org/download/bouncy-castle-java/", "packageName": "bcpg", "repo": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java", "packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.bouncycastle/bcpg-jdk18on", "modules": ["pg"], "programFiles": ["OpenPGPCertificate"], "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "1.81", "lessThan": "1.86", "versionType": "maven"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. 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{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": ["all"], "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "generic", "value": "[1.81,1.86)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 93.0, "confidence_source": "matching", "scores": [{"score": 95.0, "source": "inferred"}, {"score": 93.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "BC-JAVA", "source": "cna", "vendor": "Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc."}, "product": "bc-java", "vendor": "legion_of_the_bouncy_castle_inc."}], "created": "2026-10-03T10:30:19.107361+00:00", "updated": "2026-10-04T20:30:18.538187+00:00", "vendors": ["legion_of_the_bouncy_castle_inc.", "legion_of_the_bouncy_castle_inc.$PRODUCT$bc-java"]}