Root Cause:
The HTTP/2 DATA frame handler computed the fragment size from the attacker-controlled payload length and, when the PADDED flag was present, decremented the fragment size before ensuring that the frame contained the mandatory pad length byte. A zero-length padded DATA frame could therefore underflow the unsigned fragment size and read the pad length byte past the end of the frame buffer.
Affected Scenarios:
Apache bRPC servers that accept HTTP/2 traffic are affected when a remote client can send crafted HTTP/2 frames to the server. HTTP/2 may be reached through cleartext h2c detection on an HTTP port or through TLS ALPN negotiation.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3325
Note:
The fix validates that a padded DATA frame has enough payload bytes for the pad length field before decrementing the fragment size or reading the pad length byte. Malformed zero-length padded DATA frames are rejected with HTTP/2 FRAME_SIZE_ERROR.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
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Wed, 21 Oct 2026 17:15:00 +0000
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cvssV3_1
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Wed, 21 Oct 2026 12:00:00 +0000
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| Description | Integer underflow and out-of-bounds read in the HTTP/2 server DATA frame parser in Apache bRPC allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service by sending a malformed DATA frame with the PADDED flag set and a zero-length payload. Root Cause: The HTTP/2 DATA frame handler computed the fragment size from the attacker-controlled payload length and, when the PADDED flag was present, decremented the fragment size before ensuring that the frame contained the mandatory pad length byte. A zero-length padded DATA frame could therefore underflow the unsigned fragment size and read the pad length byte past the end of the frame buffer. Affected Scenarios: Apache bRPC servers that accept HTTP/2 traffic are affected when a remote client can send crafted HTTP/2 frames to the server. HTTP/2 may be reached through cleartext h2c detection on an HTTP port or through TLS ALPN negotiation. How to Fix: (Choose one of the following options) 1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3325 Note: The fix validates that a padded DATA frame has enough payload bytes for the pad length field before decrementing the fragment size or reading the pad length byte. Malformed zero-length padded DATA frames are rejected with HTTP/2 FRAME_SIZE_ERROR. | |
| Title | Apache bRPC: Integer Underflow and Out-of-Bounds Read in HTTP/2 DATA Frame Parser | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-125 CWE-191 |
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| References |
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Subscriptions
No data.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: apache
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-21T13:07:53.942Z
Reserved: 2026-06-21T04:43:24.873Z
Link: CVE-2026-56386
Updated: 2026-10-21T13:07:47.731Z
Status : Received
Published: 2026-10-21T12:17:21.410
Modified: 2026-10-21T14:17:19.387
Link: CVE-2026-56386
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-10-21T21:30:15Z