Export limit exceeded: 408827 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Export limit exceeded: 408827 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Search
Search Results (408827 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-64123 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hsr: defer node table free until after RCU readers HSR node-list and node-status generic-netlink operations run under rcu_read_lock(). They walk hsr->node_db through hsr_get_next_node() and hsr_get_node_data(), but RTM_DELLINK teardown removes the same node table with plain list_del() and frees each node immediately. That lets a generic-netlink reader hold a struct hsr_node pointer across hsr_dellink(). In a KASAN build, widening the reader window after hsr_get_next_node() obtains the node reproduces a slab-use-after-free when the reader copies node->macaddress_A; the freeing stack is hsr_del_nodes() from hsr_dellink(). Use list_del_rcu() and defer the free through the existing hsr_free_node_rcu() callback. This matches the lifetime rule used by the HSR prune paths, which already delete nodes with list_del_rcu() and call_rcu(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-64117 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: capture fast-RX rate before mesh reuses skb->cb ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() reads RX status through IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb), which aliases the same skb->cb storage that ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() reuses as IEEE80211_TX_INFO. In the unicast forward path, mesh_data does: info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(fwd_skb); memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); on the same skb the caller still names via rx->skb, then either queues the skb for TX (success) or kfree_skb()'s it (no-route) before returning RX_QUEUED. The caller's RX_QUEUED arm then calls sta_stats_encode_rate(status) on memory that is either zeroed (success path) or freed (no-route path). The latter is KASAN slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle. Fix by encoding the rate from status before invoking ieee80211_rx_mesh_data(), so the RX_QUEUED arm consumes a value captured while status was still backed by valid memory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64079 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: x_tables: allocate hook ops while under mutex arp/ip(6)t_register_table() add the table to the per-netns list via xt_register_table() before allocating the per-netns hook ops copy via kmemdup_array(). This leaves a window where the table is visible in the list with ops=NULL. If the pernet exit happens runs concurrently the pre_exit callback finds the table via xt_find_table() and passes the NULL ops pointer to nf_unregister_net_hooks(), causing a NULL dereference: general protection fault in nf_unregister_net_hooks+0xbc/0x150 RIP: nf_unregister_net_hooks (net/netfilter/core.c:613) Call Trace: ipt_unregister_table_pre_exit iptable_mangle_net_pre_exit ops_pre_exit_list cleanup_net Fix by moving the ops allocation into the xtables core so the table is never in the list without valid ops. Also ensure the table is no longer processing packets before its torn down on error unwind. nf_register_net_hooks might have published at least one hook; call synchronize_rcu() if there was an error. audit log register message gets deferred until all operations have passed, this avoids need to emit another ureg message in case of error unwinding. Based on earlier patch by Tristan Madani. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64067 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix missing barriers when accessing stream->subrequests locklessly The list of subrequests attached to stream->subrequests is accessed without locks by netfs_collect_read_results() and netfs_collect_write_results(), and then they access subreq->flags without taking a barrier after getting the subreq pointer from the list. Relatedly, the functions that build the list don't use any sort of write barrier when constructing the list to make sure that the NETFS_SREQ_IN_PROGRESS flag is perceived to be set first if no lock is taken. Fix this by: (1) Add a new list_add_tail_release() function that uses a release barrier to set the pointer to the new member of the list. (2) Add a new list_first_entry_or_null_acquire() function that uses an acquire barrier to read the pointer to the first member in a list (or return NULL). (3) Use list_add_tail_release() when adding a subreq to ->subrequests. (4) Use list_first_entry_or_null_acquire() when initially accessing the front of the list (when an item is removed, the pointer to the new front iterm is obtained under the same lock). | ||||
| CVE-2026-64057 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix the locking used by afs_get_link() The afs filesystem in the kernel doesn't do locking correctly for symbolic links. There are a number of problems: (1) It doesn't do any locking around afs_read_single() to prevent races between multiple ->get_link() calls, thereby allowing the possibility of leaks. (2) It doesn't use RCU barriering when accessing the buffer pointers during RCU pathwalk. (3) It can race with another thread updating the contents of the symlink if a third party updated it on the server. Fix this by the following means: (0) Move symlink handling into its own file as this makes it more complicated. (1) Take the validate_lock around afs_read_single() to prevent races between multiple ->get_link() calls. (2) Keep a separate copy of the symlink contents with an rcu_head. This is always going to be a lot smaller than a page, so it can be kmalloc'd and save quite a bit of memory. It also needs a refcount for non-RCU pathwalk. (3) Split the symlink read and write-to-cache routines in afs from those for directories. (4) Discard the I/O buffer as soon as the write-to-cache completes as this is a full page (plus a folio_queue). (5) If there's no cache, discard the I/O buffer immediately after reading and copying if there is no cache. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64040 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: Fix error return when vfs_mkdir() fails When vfs_mkdir() fails, the error code is not extracted from the returned error pointer. This causes mkdir_error to be reached with ret=0, which leads to returning ERR_PTR(0) (NULL) instead of a proper error pointer. Fix this by extracting the error code from the error pointer when vfs_mkdir() fails. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64020 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-pci: fix dma_vecs leak on p2p memory We don't unmap P2P memory, so we don't need to track it. The dma_vec allocation was getting leaked on the completion. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64019 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-pci: fix dma mapping leak on data setup error We're leaking the initial DMA mapping during iteration if we fail to allocate the tracking descriptor for both PRP and SGL. Unmap the iterator directly; we can't use the existing unmap helper because it depends on the tracking descriptor being successfully allocated, so a new one for an in-use iterator is provided. The mappings were also leaking when the driver detects an invalid bio_vec when mapping PRPs, so fix that too. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64013 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: button: Fix ACPI GPE handler leak during removal Commit a7e23ec17fee ("ACPI: button: Install notifier for system events as well") changed the ACPI notify handler type for ACPI buttons to ACPI_ALL_NOTIFY, but it forgot to update acpi_button_remove() to reflect that change. This leads to leaking the notify handler past driver removal, which may cause a kernel crash to occur if ACPI notify on the given device is triggered after removing the driver, and causes a subsequent probe of the given device with the same driver to fail. Address this by updating the acpi_remove_notify_handler() call in acpi_button_remove() as appropriate. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63983 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fix packet loop on netem when duplicate is on When netem duplicates a packet it re-enqueues the copy at the root qdisc. If another netem sits in the tree the copy can be duplicated again, recursing until the stack or memory is exhausted. The original duplication guard temporarily zeroed q->duplicate around the re-enqueue, but that does not cover all cases because it is per-qdisc state shared across all concurrent enqueue paths and is not safe without additional locking. Use the skb tc_depth field introduced in an earlier patch: - increment it on the duplicate before re-enqueue - skip duplication for any skb whose tc_depth is already non-zero. This marks the packet itself rather than mutating qdisc state, therefore it is safe regardless of tree topology or concurrency. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63941 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Correctly cap ZCR_EL2 provided by a guest hypervisor ZCR_EL2 can be updated by a VHE guest hypervisor either using ZCR_EL2 (which traps) or ZCR_EL1 (which does not trap). KVM handles both in different way: - on ZCR_EL2 trap, ZCR_EL2.LEN is immediately capped at the VM's own VL limit. This has the potential to break existing SW that relies on the full LEN field to be stateful. - on ZCR_EL1 access, we do absolutely nothing. On restoring the SVE context for an L2 guest, we directly restore the guest hypervisor's view of ZCR_EL2 into the physical ZCR_EL2. If the guest's view of the register was updated using the ZCR_EL2 accessor, the value has already been sanitised (with the caveat mentioned above). But if the guest used ZCR_EL1, the raw value is written into the HW, and the L2 guest can now access VLs that it shouldn't. Fix all the above by moving the VL capping to the restore points, ensuring that: - the HW is always programmed with a capped value, irrespective of the accessor being used, - the ZCR_EL2.LEN field is always completely stateful, irrespective of the accessor being used. Additionally, move ZCR_EL2 to be a sanitised register, ensuring that only the LEN field is actually stateful. This requires some creative construction of the RES0 mask, as the sysreg generation script does not yet generate RAZ/WI fields. [maz: rewrote commit message, tidy up access_zcr_el2()] | ||||
| CVE-2026-63879 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix amdgpu_hmm_range_get_pages The notifier sequence must only be read once or otherwise we could work with invalid pages. While at it also fix the coding style, e.g. drop the pre-initialized return value and use the common define for 2G range. (cherry picked from commit c08972f555945cda57b0adb72272a37910153390) | ||||
| CVE-2026-63858 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: add hook transactions for device deletions Restore the flag that indicates that the hook is going away, ie. NFT_HOOK_REMOVE, but add a new transaction object to track deletion of hooks without altering the basechain/flowtable hook_list during the preparation phase. The existing approach that moves the hook from the basechain/flowtable hook_list to transaction hook_list breaks netlink dump path readers of this RCU-protected list. It should be possible use an array for nft_trans_hook to store the deleted hooks to compact the representation but I am not expecting many hook object, specially now that wildcard support for devices is in place. Note that the nft_trans_chain_hooks() list contains a list of struct nft_trans_hook objects for DELCHAIN and DELFLOWTABLE commands, while this list stores struct nft_hook objects for NEWCHAIN and NEWFLOWTABLE. Note that new commands can be updated to use nft_trans_hook for consistency. This patch also adapts the event notification path to deal with the list of hook transactions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63811 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the previously written data back from the COW inode: prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode: f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)->cow_inode : inode, ...); and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption (STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(). However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode (folio->mapping->host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode's context, not the COW inode's -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off fio->page->mapping->host. fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise operates on folio->mapping->host. The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits its encryption policy from there. With test_dummy_encryption the newly created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g. already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted. The read path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted original inode) has a NULL ->i_crypt_info, dereferencing it: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] RIP: 0010:fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks+0xa0/0x310 Workqueue: f2fs_post_read_wq f2fs_post_read_work Call Trace: fscrypt_decrypt_bio+0x1eb/0x340 f2fs_post_read_work+0xba/0x140 process_one_work+0x91c/0x1a40 worker_thread+0x677/0xe90 kthread+0x2bc/0x3a0 The COW inode is only needed to locate the on-disk block, and that block address is already resolved into @blkaddr by prepare_atomic_write_begin() via __find_data_block(cow_inode, ...); f2fs_submit_page_read() then reads from that physical @blkaddr directly, so the inode argument only selects the post-read crypto context, not which block is fetched. Reading with @inode therefore returns the same (latest, not-yet-committed) COW data, while making both the fs-layer decryption decision and the inline crypto path use the correct (original inode's) key. With the COW inode no longer used at the read site, the use_cow flag has no remaining consumer; drop it from f2fs_write_begin() and prepare_atomic_write_begin(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-53401 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: omap2: fix use-after-free in omapfb_mmap omapfb_mmap() has a race condition with OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE ioctl that can lead to use-after-free: The fb_mmap() entry point holds mm_lock but not lock (fb_info->lock), while ioctl handlers like OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE hold lock but not mm_lock. This allows concurrent execution. In omapfb_mmap(): 1. rg = omapfb_get_mem_region(ofbi->region); // Get old region ref 2. start = omapfb_get_region_paddr(ofbi); // Read from NEW region 3. len = fix->smem_len; // Read from NEW region 4. vm_iomap_memory(vma, start, len); // Map NEW region memory 5. atomic_inc(&rg->map_count); // Increment OLD region! Concurrently, OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE can: - Reassign ofbi->region = new_rg - Update fix->smem_len - OMAPFB_SETUP_MEM then checks NEW region's map_count (0!) and frees it This leaves userspace with a mapping to freed physical memory. The fix is to read all required values (start, len) from the same region reference (rg) that will have its map_count incremented, preventing the region from being freed while still mapped. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53308 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: supply: max77705: Free allocated workqueue and fix removal order Use devm interface for allocating workqueue to fix two bugs at the same time: 1. Driver leaks the memory on remove(), because the workqueue is not destroyed. 2. Driver allocates workqueue and then registers interrupt handlers with devm interface. This means that probe error paths will not use a reversed order, but first destroy the workqueue and then, via devm release handlers, free the interrupt. The interrupt handler schedules work on this exact workqueue, thus if interrupt is hit in this short time window - after destroying workqueue, but before devm() frees the interrupt - the schedulled work will lead to use of freed memory. Change is not equivalent in the workqueue itself: use non-legacy API which does not set (__WQ_LEGACY | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM). The workqueue is used to update power supply (power_supply_changed()) status, thus there is no point to run it for memory reclaim. Note that dev_name() is not directly used in second argument to prevent possible unlikely parsing any "%" character in device name as format. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53292 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: phonet: do not BUG_ON() in pn_socket_autobind() on failed bind syzbot reported a kernel BUG triggered from pn_socket_sendmsg() via pn_socket_autobind(): kernel BUG at net/phonet/socket.c:213! RIP: 0010:pn_socket_autobind net/phonet/socket.c:213 [inline] RIP: 0010:pn_socket_sendmsg+0x240/0x250 net/phonet/socket.c:421 Call Trace: sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x112/0x150 net/socket.c:797 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:812 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x402/0x590 net/socket.c:2280 ... pn_socket_autobind() calls pn_socket_bind() with port 0 and, on -EINVAL, assumes the socket was already bound and asserts that the port is non-zero: err = pn_socket_bind(sock, ..., sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn)); if (err != -EINVAL) return err; BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject)); return 0; /* socket was already bound */ However pn_socket_bind() also returns -EINVAL when sk->sk_state is not TCP_CLOSE, even when the socket has never been bound and pn_port() is still 0. In that case the BUG_ON() fires and panics the kernel from a user-triggerable path. Treat the "bind returned -EINVAL but pn_port() is still 0" case as a regular error and propagate -EINVAL to the caller instead of crashing. Existing callers already translate a non-zero return from pn_socket_autobind() into -ENOBUFS/-EAGAIN, so returning -EINVAL here only changes behaviour from panic to a normal errno. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53285 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Wrap DCN32 phantom-plane allocation in DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED [Why] dcn32_validate_bandwidth() wraps dcn32_internal_validate_bw() with DC_FP_START()/DC_FP_END(). In x86 non-RT, DC_FP_START takes fpregs_lock(), which disables local softirqs. The DML1 path through dcn32_enable_phantom_plane() calls kvzalloc() to allocate ~335 KiB for dc_plane_state. This triggers the vmalloc path, which calls BUG_ON(in_interrupt()) because it's invoked within the FPU-enabled (softirq disabled) region, leading to a kernel crash. [How] Wrap the dc_state_create_phantom_plane() call with the DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED() macro to allow preemption during this memory allocation. (cherry picked from commit 885ccbef7b94a8b38f69c4211c679021aa27ad11) | ||||
| CVE-2026-53257 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: enforce HE/EHT cap/oper consistency Xiang Mei reports that mac80211 could crash if eht_cap is set but eht_oper isn't. Rather than fixing that for the individual user(s), enforce that both HE/EHT have consistent elements. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53222 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ptp: ocp: fix resource freeing order Commit a60fc3294a37 ("ptp: rework ptp_clock_unregister() to disable events") added a call to ptp_disable_all_events() which changes the configuration of pins if they support EXTTS events. In ptp_ocp_detach() pins resources are freed before ptp_clock_unregister() and it leads to use-after-free during driver removal. Fix it by changing the order of free/unregister calls. To avoid irq handler running on the other core while ptp device unregistering, call synchronize_irq() after HW is configured to stop producing irqs and no irqs are in-flight. | ||||