Export limit exceeded: 417557 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Search
Search Results (417557 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68211 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: stm32-dcmipp: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(), vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued buffers leak. dcmipp_bytecap_start_streaming() returned -EINVAL when the source subdevice could not be resolved from the media graph, before pm_runtime_resume_and_get() and media_pipeline_start() had been called. The remaining error paths already converge on the err_buffer_done label, which calls dcmipp_bytecap_all_buffers_done(..., VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED). Jump to that label directly: the intermediate err_pm_put / err_media_pipeline_stop labels are skipped, which is correct because nothing they would undo has happened yet. This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68105 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix kernel panic during driver load failure Avoid kernel panic if MES init fails during driver load. The KIQ ring is falsely marked as ready as ASICs that use MES, KIQ is owned by MES. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:gfx_v12_1_wait_reg_mem+0x5a/0x1f0 [amdgpu] Call Trace: gfx_v12_1_ring_emit_reg_write_reg_wait+0x1f/0x30 [amdgpu] amdgpu_gmc_fw_reg_write_reg_wait+0xb2/0x190 [amdgpu] amdgpu_gmc_flush_gpu_tlb+0x1cc/0x230 [amdgpu] amdgpu_gart_invalidate_tlb+0x81/0xa0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_gart_unbind+0x72/0x90 [amdgpu] amdgpu_ttm_backend_unbind+0xa4/0xb0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_ttm_tt_unpopulate+0x13/0xd0 [amdgpu] amdttm_tt_unpopulate+0x29/0x70 [amdttm] ttm_bo_put+0x1eb/0x360 [amdttm] amdgpu_bo_free_kernel+0xf9/0x1f0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_ih_ring_fini+0x5a/0x90 [amdgpu] amdgpu_irq_fini_hw+0x58/0x80 [amdgpu] amdgpu_device_fini_hw+0x4e0/0x5b0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x60/0xa0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x28e/0x6d0 [amdgpu] pci_device_probe+0x19f/0x220 really_probe+0x1ed/0x340 driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x80 __driver_attach+0xd3/0x1a0 bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xa0 bus_add_driver+0x19f/0x270 driver_register+0x5d/0xf0 do_one_initcall+0xac/0x200 do_init_module+0x1ec/0x280 __se_sys_finit_module+0x2de/0x310 do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x250 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 (cherry picked from commit 4623b958dd6da0f4c3026afdf330626a09ecb0f0) | ||||
| CVE-2026-64539 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: eir: Fix stack OOB write when prepending the Flags AD eir_create_adv_data() builds the advertising data into a fixed-size buffer ("size", 31 for the legacy path). It may prepend a 3-byte "Flags" AD structure (LE_AD_NO_BREDR on an LE-only controller) and then copies the per-instance data without checking that it still fits: memcpy(ptr, adv->adv_data, adv->adv_data_len); tlv_data_max_len() only reserves those 3 bytes when the user-supplied flags carry a managed-flags bit, so an instance added with flags == 0 is accepted with adv_data_len up to the full buffer. At advertise time the flags are still prepended, and the memcpy() writes 3 + adv_data_len bytes into the size-byte buffer: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in eir_create_adv_data (net/bluetooth/eir.c:301) Write of size 31 at addr ffff88800a547bdc by task kworker/u9:0/65 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:106) eir_create_adv_data (net/bluetooth/eir.c:301) hci_update_adv_data_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:1310) hci_schedule_adv_instance_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:1817) hci_cmd_sync_work (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332) This frame has 1 object: [32, 64) 'cp' The "Flags" structure is added by the kernel, not requested by userspace, so only prepend it when it fits together with the instance advertising data; when there is no room for both, drop the flags rather than the user-provided data. Reachable by a local user with CAP_NET_ADMIN owning an LE-only controller on the legacy advertising path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64523 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold. Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path. The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction. The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64513 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update The TPR_THRESHOLD field in the VMCS is used by VMX to induce VM exits when the guest's virtual TPR falls under the specified threshold, allowing KVM to inject previously masked interrupts. KVM handles these VM exits in handle_tpr_below_threshold(). Commit eb90f3417a0c ("KVM: vmx: speed up TPR below threshold vmexits") optimized this function by calling apic_update_ppr() instead of raising KVM_REQ_EVENT. apic_update_ppr() then raises KVM_REQ_EVENT if there is a pending, deliverable interrupt. However, if there are no new interrupts pending, apic_update_ppr() does not issue the request. Thus, kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() and vmx_update_cr8_intercept() are not called before VM entry, which results in a high, stale TPR_THRESHOLD. This is problematic due to the following sentence in 28.2.1.1 "VM-Execution Control Fields" in the SDM: The following check is performed if the “use TPR shadow” VM-execution control is 1 and the “virtualize APIC accesses” and “virtual-interrupt delivery” VM-execution controls are both 0: the value of bits 3:0 of the TPR threshold VM-execution control field should not be greater than the value of bits 7:4 of VTPR. This error condition is typically not observed when KVM runs on a bare metal system because modern processors support APICv, which enables virtual-interrupt delivery, and which KVM uses when possible. This causes the processor to no longer generate TPR-below-threshold exits and to no longer check TPR_THRESHOLD on entry. However, when running on older platforms, or under nested virtualization on a hypervisor that does not support virtual-interrupt delivery and enforces this check (like Hyper-V) this can cause a VM entry failure with hardware error 0x7, as seen in [1]. Call kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() if apic_update_ppr() does not find a deliverable interrupt (and thus does not raise KVM_REQ_EVENT). Remove calls to kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() on paths that end up in apic_update_ppr(), as they now become redundant. This ensures that any path that updates the guest's PPR also figures out if KVM needs to wait for a TPR change (using TPR_THRESHOLD on VMX or CR8 intercepts on SVM). | ||||
| CVE-2026-64377 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpufreq: qcom-cpufreq-hw: Fix possible double free qcom_cpufreq.data is allocated with devm_kzalloc() in probe() as an array of per-domain data. qcom_cpufreq_hw_cpu_init() stores a pointer to one element of this array in policy->driver_data. qcom_cpufreq_hw_cpu_exit() currently calls kfree() on policy->driver_data. This is not valid because the memory is devm-managed. For the first domain, this can free the devm-managed allocation while the devres entry is still active, leading to a possible double free when the platform device is later detached. For other domains, the pointer may refer to an element inside the array rather than the allocation base. Remove the kfree(data) call and let devres release qcom_cpufreq.data. This issue was found by a static analysis tool I am developing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64283 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: guest_memfd: Treat memslot binding offset+size as unsigned values When binding a memslot to a guest_memfd file, treat the offset and size as unsigned values to fix a bug where the sum of the two can result in a false negative when checking for overflow against the size of the file. Passing unsigned values also avoids relying on somewhat obscure checks in other flows for safety, and tracks the offset and size as they are intended to be tracked, as unsigned values. On 64-bit kernels, the number of pages a memslot contains and thus the size (and offset) of its guest_memfd binding are unsigned 64-bit values. Taking the offset+size as an loff_t instead of a uoff_t inadvertently converts the unsigned value to a signed value if the offset and/or size is massive. Locally storing the offset and size as signed values is benign in and of itself (though even that is *extremely* difficult to discern), but operating on their sum is not. For the offset, KVM explicitly checks against a negative value, which might seem like a bug as KVM could incorrectly reject a legitimate binding, but that's not actually the case as KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD takes a signed value for its size, i.e. a would-be-negative offset is also greater than the maximum possible size of any guest_memfd file. Regarding the size, while KVM lacks an explicit check for a negative value, i.e. seemingly has a flawed overflow check, KVM restricts the number of pages in a single memslot to the largest positive signed 32-bit value: if (id < KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS && (mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES) return -EINVAL; and so that maximum "size" will ever be is 0x7fffffff000. The sum of the two is, however, problematic. While the size is restricted by KVM's memslot logic, the offset is not, i.e. the offset is completely unchecked until the "offset + size > i_size_read(inode)" check. If the offset is the (nearly) largest possible _positive_ value, then adding size to the offset can result in a signed, negative 64-bit value. When compared against the size of the file (guaranteed to be positive), the negative sum is always smaller, and KVM incorrectly allows the absurd offset. Opportunistically add missing includes in kvm_mm.h (instead of relying on its parents). | ||||
| CVE-2026-64241 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: rockchip: teardown bugs and resource leaks Address several teardown issues and resource leaks in the driver's remove path and error handling: 1. Debounce clock reference leak: The debounce clock (bank->db_clk) is obtained using of_clk_get() which increments the clock's reference count, but clk_put() is never called. Register a devm action to cleanly release it on unbind. Note that of_clk_get(..., 1) remains necessary over devm_clk_get() because the DT binding does not define clock-names, precluding name-based lookup. 2. Unregistered chained IRQ handler: The chained IRQ handler is not disconnected in remove(). If a stray interrupt fires after the driver is removed, the kernel attempts to execute a stale handler, leading to a panic. Fix this by clearing the handler in remove(). 3. IRQ domain leak: The linear IRQ domain and its generic chips are allocated manually during probe but never removed. Remove the IRQ domain during driver teardown to free the associated generic chips and mappings. [Bartosz: don't emit an error message on devres allocation failure] | ||||
| CVE-2026-64159 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix zeropoint update where i_size > remote_i_size Fix the update of the zero point[*] by netfs_release_folio() when there is uncommitted data in the pagecache beyond the folio being released but the on-server EOF is in this folio (ie. i_size > remote_i_size). The update needs to limit zero_point to remote_i_size, not i_size as i_size is a local phenomenon reflecting updates made locally to the pagecache, not stuff written to the server. remote_i_size tracks the server's i_size. [*] The zero point is the file position from which we can assume that the server will just return zeros, so we can avoid generating reads. Note that netfs_invalidate_folio() probably doesn't need fixing as zero_point should be updated by setattr after truncation or fallocate. Found with: fsx -q -N 1000000 -p 10000 -o 128000 -l 600000 \ /xfstest.test/junk --replay-ops=junk.fsxops using the following as junk.fsxops: truncate 0x0 0x1bbae 0x82864 write 0x3ef2e 0xf9c8 0x1bbae write 0x67e05 0xcb5a 0x4e8f6 mapread 0x57781 0x85b6 0x7495f copy_range 0x5d3d 0x10329 0x54fac 0x7495f write 0x64710 0x1c2b 0x7495f mapread 0x64000 0x1000 0x7495f on cifs with the default cache option. It shows read-gaps on folio 0x64 failing with a short read (ie. it hits EOF) if the FMODE_READ check is commented out in netfs_perform_write(): if (//(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) || netfs_is_cache_enabled(ctx)) { and no fscache. This was initially found with the generic/522 xfstest. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64154 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm/adreno: Fix a reference leak in a6xx_gpu_init() In a6xx_gpu_init(), node is obtained via of_parse_phandle(). While there was a manual of_node_put() at the end of the common path, several early error returns would bypass this call, resulting in a reference leak. Fix this by using the __free(device_node) cleanup handler to release the reference when the variable goes out of scope. Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/700661/ | ||||
| CVE-2026-64117 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: capture fast-RX rate before mesh reuses skb->cb ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() reads RX status through IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb), which aliases the same skb->cb storage that ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() reuses as IEEE80211_TX_INFO. In the unicast forward path, mesh_data does: info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(fwd_skb); memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); on the same skb the caller still names via rx->skb, then either queues the skb for TX (success) or kfree_skb()'s it (no-route) before returning RX_QUEUED. The caller's RX_QUEUED arm then calls sta_stats_encode_rate(status) on memory that is either zeroed (success path) or freed (no-route path). The latter is KASAN slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle. Fix by encoding the rate from status before invoking ieee80211_rx_mesh_data(), so the RX_QUEUED arm consumes a value captured while status was still backed by valid memory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64079 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: x_tables: allocate hook ops while under mutex arp/ip(6)t_register_table() add the table to the per-netns list via xt_register_table() before allocating the per-netns hook ops copy via kmemdup_array(). This leaves a window where the table is visible in the list with ops=NULL. If the pernet exit happens runs concurrently the pre_exit callback finds the table via xt_find_table() and passes the NULL ops pointer to nf_unregister_net_hooks(), causing a NULL dereference: general protection fault in nf_unregister_net_hooks+0xbc/0x150 RIP: nf_unregister_net_hooks (net/netfilter/core.c:613) Call Trace: ipt_unregister_table_pre_exit iptable_mangle_net_pre_exit ops_pre_exit_list cleanup_net Fix by moving the ops allocation into the xtables core so the table is never in the list without valid ops. Also ensure the table is no longer processing packets before its torn down on error unwind. nf_register_net_hooks might have published at least one hook; call synchronize_rcu() if there was an error. audit log register message gets deferred until all operations have passed, this avoids need to emit another ureg message in case of error unwinding. Based on earlier patch by Tristan Madani. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64068 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix missing locking around retry adding new subreqs Fix netfs_retry_read_subrequests() and netfs_retry_write_stream() to take the appropriate lock when adding extra subrequests into stream->subrequests. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64060 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix leak of request in netfs_write_begin() error handling Fix netfs_write_begin() to not leak our ref on the request in the event that we get an error from netfs_wait_for_read(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-64024 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 9.4 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix stale per-CPU tcp_tw_isn leak enabling ISN prediction Blamed commit moved the TIME_WAIT-derived ISN from the skb control block to a per-CPU variable, assuming the value would always be consumed by tcp_conn_request() for the same packet that wrote it. That assumption is violated by multiple drop paths between the producer (__this_cpu_write(tcp_tw_isn, isn) in tcp_v{4,6}_rcv()) and the consumer (tcp_conn_request()): - min_ttl / min_hopcount check - xfrm policy check - tcp_inbound_hash() MD5/AO mismatch - tcp_filter() eBPF/SO_ATTACH_FILTER drop - th->syn && th->fin discard in tcp_rcv_state_process() TCP_LISTEN - psp_sk_rx_policy_check() in tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv() - tcp_checksum_complete() in tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv() - tcp_v{4,6}_cookie_check() returning NULL When a packet is dropped on any of these paths, tcp_tw_isn is left set. The next SYN processed on the same CPU then consumes the non zero value in tcp_conn_request(), receiving a potentially predictable ISN. This patch moves back tcp_tw_isn to skb->cb[], getting rid of the per-cpu variable. Note that tcp_v{4,6}_fill_cb() do not set it. Very litle impact on overall code size/complexity: $ scripts/bloat-o-meter -t vmlinux.old vmlinux.new add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 2/1 up/down: 8/-15 (-7) Function old new delta tcp_v6_rcv 3038 3042 +4 tcp_v4_rcv 3035 3039 +4 tcp_conn_request 2938 2923 -15 Total: Before=24436060, After=24436053, chg -0.00% | ||||
| CVE-2026-64001 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix setup list UAF on proc write error snd_pcm_oss_proc_write() links a newly allocated setup entry into the OSS setup list before duplicating the task name. If the task-name allocation fails, the error path frees the already linked entry and leaves setup_list pointing at freed memory. A later OSS device open can then walk the stale list entry in snd_pcm_oss_look_for_setup() and dereference freed memory. Allocate the task name and initialize the setup entry before publishing the entry on setup_list. Also fetch the initial proc read iterator only after taking setup_mutex, so all setup_list traversal follows the same list lifetime rules. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63999 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: rss: fix indir_table and hkey leak on get_rxfh failure rss_prepare_get() allocates the indirection table and hash key buffer via rss_get_data_alloc(), then calls ops->get_rxfh() to populate them. If get_rxfh() fails, the function returns an error without freeing the allocation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63998 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: module: call ethnl_ops_complete() on module flash errors When validate() fails we are skipping over ethnl_ops_complete() even tho we already called ethnl_ops_begin(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-63979 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit() reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put() (svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory. The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected. Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file. Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference, either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore redundant and goes away. Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count assertions stay balanced. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63857 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: airoha: Do not read uninitialized fragment address in airoha_dev_xmit() The transmit loop in airoha_dev_xmit() reads fragment address and length during its final iteration, when the loop index equals skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags, at which point the fragment data is uninitialized. While these values are never consumed, the read itself is unsafe and may trigger a page fault. Fix this by avoiding the fragment read on the last iteration. Additionally, move the skb pointer from the first to the last used packet descriptor, so that airoha_qdma_tx_napi_poll() defers freeing the skb until the final descriptor is processed. | ||||