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Search Results (424104 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-72252 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: don't leak bad clone into future transaction On memory allocation failure the cloned nft_pipapo_match can enter a bad state: - some fields can have their lookup tables resized while others did not - bits might have been toggled - scratch map can be undersized which also means m->bsize_max can be lower than what is required This means that the next insertion in the same batch can trigger out-of-bounds writes. Furthermore, a failure in the first can result in the bad clone to leak into the next transaction because the abort callback is never executed in this case (the upper layer saw an error and no attempt to allocate a transactional request was made). Record a state for the nft_pipapo_match structure: - NEW (pristine clone) - MOD (modified clone with good state) - ERR (potentially bogus content) Then make it so that deletes and insertions fail when the clone entered ERR state. In case the very first insert attempt results in an error, free the clone right away. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72251 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_nat_sip: reload possible stale data pointer quoting sashiko: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [..] noticed a potential memory bug and header corruption involving the SIP NAT helper. In net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c:nf_nat_sip(): if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, skb->len)) { nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "cannot mangle packet"); return NF_DROP; } uh = (void *)skb->data + protoff; uh->dest = ct_sip_info->forced_dport; if (!nf_nat_mangle_udp_packet(skb, ct, ctinfo, protoff, 0, 0, NULL, 0)) { If a cloned or fragmented SKB is reallocated by skb_ensure_writable(), the old data buffer is freed. However, nf_nat_sip() fails to update *dptr to point to the new buffer. It also appears to use nf_nat_mangle_udp_packet() on what could be a TCP packet, which would overwrite the sequence number with a checksum update. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ nf_conntrack_sip linerizes skbs, hence no fragmented skb can be seen. But clones are possible, so rebuild dptr. Disable nf_nat_mangle_udp_packet() branch for TCP streams. It doesn't look like this can ever happen, else we should have received bug reports about this, so just check the conntrack is UDP and drop otherwise. The calling conntrack_sip set ->forced_dport for SIP_HDR_VIA_UDP messages, so I don't think this is ever expected to be true for a TCP stream. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72250 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: guard mac_header adjustment after IPv6 defrag nf_ct_frag6_reasm() slides the packet head forward to drop the IPv6 fragment header and then unconditionally advances skb->mac_header: skb->mac_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr); On the NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT defrag path the skb has no link-layer header yet, so skb->mac_header is still the "not set" sentinel (u16)~0U. Adding sizeof(struct frag_hdr) wraps it to a small value (0xffff + 8 == 7), after which skb_mac_header_was_set() wrongly reports a MAC header is present and skb_mac_header() points into the headroom. The reassembler has done this unconditional add since it was introduced; it was harmless while mac_header was a bare pointer, but wrong once mac_header became a u16 offset whose unset state is the ~0U sentinel tested by skb_mac_header_was_set(). The sibling net/ipv6/reassembly.c does the same relocation and does guard the adjustment; mirror the guard here. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72247 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conncount: fix zone comparison in tuple dedup The "already exists" dedup logic in __nf_conncount_add() decides whether a connection has already been counted and can be skipped instead of incrementing the connlimit count. It compares the conntrack zone of a list entry with the zone of the connection being added using nf_ct_zone_id() and nf_ct_zone_equal(), passing conn->zone.dir or zone->dir as the direction argument. Those helpers take enum ip_conntrack_dir values: IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL is 0 and IP_CT_DIR_REPLY is 1. However, zone->dir is a u8 bitmask: NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_ORIG is 1, NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_REPL is 2 and NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR is 3. Passing that bitmask as the enum direction shifts the meaning of every non-zero value. An ORIG-only zone passes 1 and is tested as REPLY, while REPL-only and default zones pass 2 or 3 and test bits beyond the valid direction range. In those cases nf_ct_zone_id() can fall back to NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID instead of using the real zone id, so different zones can be treated as equal and dedup collapses to tuple equality alone. nf_conncount stores and compares the original-direction tuple for a connection. If an skb already has an attached conntrack entry, get_ct_or_tuple_from_skb() explicitly copies ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple, regardless of the packet's ctinfo. Therefore the zone comparison in the tuple dedup path must use IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL as well; the zone direction bitmask describes where a zone id applies, not which direction this conncount tuple represents. Fix the two dedup comparisons by passing IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL directly. Do not special-case NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR and do not compare raw zone ids: using the existing helpers with IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL preserves the direction-aware NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID fallback. A default bidirectional zone contains the ORIG bit, so it naturally returns the real zone id; reply-only zones continue to fall back for original-direction tuple comparisons. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72244 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpu/buddy: bail out of try_harder when alignment cannot be honoured The try_harder contiguous fallback could return a range whose start offset did not match the caller's min_block_size. When a candidate's start is misaligned, realign it: free the misaligned run and reallocate exactly @size at the next lower min_block_size boundary. This keeps the returned size unchanged with no surplus to trim, and rejects the request only when no aligned candidate fits. v2: align misaligned candidates down to min_block_size instead of bailing out, for both the RHS and LHS paths (Matthew). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72243 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: check connect-related permissions on TCP Fast Open Similar to Landlock, SELinux was not updated when TCP Fast Open support was introduced to ensure connect-related permissions are checked when using TCP Fast Open. Update its socket_sendmsg() hook to call selinux_socket_connect() when MSG_FASTOPEN is passed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72242 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: avoid sk_socket dereference in selinux_sctp_bind_connect() selinux_sctp_bind_connect() dereferences sk->sk_socket to pass a struct socket * to selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper(). However, when the hook is invoked from the ASCONF softirq path (sctp_process_asconf), there is no file reference guaranteeing that sk->sk_socket is non-NULL. The setsockopt callers (bindx, connectx, set_primary, sendmsg connect) hold a file reference and are not affected. Both selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper() immediately resolve sock->sk, never using the struct socket * for anything else. Refactor the inner logic into helpers that take a struct sock * directly so that selinux_sctp_bind_connect() never needs to touch sk->sk_socket at all. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72235 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: retrieve ethhdr after potential skb realloc on RX pskb_may_pull() in batadv_interface_rx() could reallocate the buffer behind the skb. Variables which were pointing to the old buffer need to be reassigned to avoid an use-after-free. This was done correctly for the VLAN header but missed for the ethernet header which is later used for the TT and AP isolation handling. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72234 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: access unicast_ttvn skb->data only after skb realloc The pskb_may_pull() called by batadv_get_vid() could reallocate the buffer behind the skb. Variables which were pointing to the old buffer need to be reassigned to avoid an use-after-free. This was done correctly for the ethernet header but missed for the unicast_packet pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72233 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: bla: reacquire gw address after skb realloc The pskb_may_pull() called by batadv_bla_is_backbone_gw() could reallocate the buffer behind the skb. Variables which were pointing to the old buffer need to be reassigned to avoid an use-after-free. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72232 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: ensure minimal ethernet header on TX As documented in commit 8bd67ebb50c0 ("net: bridge: xmit: make sure we have at least eth header len bytes"), it is possible by for a local user with eBPF TC hook access to attach a tc filter which truncates the packet and redirects to an batadv interface. But the code assumes that at least ETH_HLEN bytes are available and thus might read outside of the available buffer. The batadv_interface_tx() must therefore always check itself if enough data is available for the ethernet header and don't rely on min_header_len. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72231 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tt: avoid request storms during pending request batadv_send_tt_request() allocates a tt_req_node when none exists for the destination originator node. This should prevent that a multiple TT requests are send at the same time to an originator. But if allocation of the send buffer failed, this request must be cleaned up again. But indicator for such a failure is "ret == false". But the actual implementation is checking for "ret == true". The check must be inverted to not loose the information about the TT request directly after it was attempted to be sent out. This should avoid potential request storms. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72226 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tt: prevent TVLV OOB check overflow A TT unicast TVLV contains the number of VLANs stored in it. This number is an u16 and gets multiplied by the size of the struct batadv_tvlv_tt_vlan_data (8 bytes). The size can therefore overflow the u16 used to store the tt_vlan_len. All additional safety checks to prevent out-of-bounds access of the TVLV buffer are invalid due to this overflow. Using size_t prevents this overflow and ensures that the safety checks compare against the actual buffer requirements. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72225 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jbd2: fix integer underflow in jbd2_journal_initialize_fast_commit() jbd2_journal_initialize_fast_commit() validates journal capacity by checking (journal->j_last - num_fc_blks < JBD2_MIN_JOURNAL_BLOCKS). Both j_last and num_fc_blks are unsigned, so when num_fc_blks exceeds j_last the subtraction wraps to a large value, bypassing the bounds check. The resulting underflow corrupts j_last, j_fc_first, and j_free, leading to journal abort. Fix by checking num_fc_blks against j_last before the subtraction, returning -EFSCORRUPTED. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72222 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback svc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in tls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through tls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only sock_hold(req->hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct svc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of(). Two close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed svc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards its return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has already set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have finished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The cancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces the same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns <= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns false, the function does not drain, returns, and svc_handle_xprt() calls svc_xprt_received(), which clears XPT_BUSY and can drop the last reference. A concurrent close then runs svc_sock_free() while svc_tcp_handshake_done() is still updating xpt_flags and walking svsk->sk_handshake_done. The corruption surfaces as set_bit/clear_bit RMW into the freed xpt_flags slab slot and as complete_all() walking and writing the freed wait_queue_head_t list embedded in sk_handshake_done -- a slab-corruption primitive, not a benign read. The path is reachable on any TLS-enabled NFS server whenever a connection close overlaps the tlshd downcall delivery window; the interruptible wait means signal delivery suffices, not just SVC_HANDSHAKE_TO expiry. Take svc_xprt_get(xprt) immediately before tls_server_hello_x509() so the in-flight callback owns its own reference. Release it on the two edges where the callback is guaranteed not to fire -- submission failure from tls_server_hello_x509() and a successful tls_handshake_cancel() -- and at the tail of svc_tcp_handshake_done() after complete_all(). [cel: rewrote commit message to describe the actual change] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72221 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: wait for in-flight TLS handshake callback when cancel loses race When wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() in svc_tcp_handshake() returns 0 (timeout) or -ERESTARTSYS (signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() then returns false, handshake_complete() has won the cancellation race: it has set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and is about to invoke svc_tcp_handshake_done(), but the callback's side effects on xpt_flags and on svsk->sk_handshake_done have not yet committed. The current code reads xpt_flags immediately to decide whether the session succeeded. Two races result. If the callback has executed set_bit(XPT_TLS_SESSION) but not yet clear_bit(XPT_HANDSHAKE), svc_tcp_handshake() sees a session, enqueues the transport, and returns. svc_xprt_received() then clears XPT_BUSY, a worker thread picks the transport up, the dispatcher in svc_handle_xprt() observes XPT_HANDSHAKE still set, and xpo_handshake is invoked a second time. That svc_tcp_handshake() calls init_completion(&svsk->sk_handshake_done) while the original callback concurrently calls complete_all() on it, corrupting the embedded swait_queue. If the callback has set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but not yet entered svc_tcp_handshake_done(), svc_tcp_handshake() reads XPT_TLS_SESSION as clear and tears the connection down even though the handshake is about to succeed. Wait for the callback to commit before inspecting xpt_flags. The completion is guaranteed to fire because handshake_complete() invokes svc_tcp_handshake_done() unconditionally once it has set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72197 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound DeleteIndexEntryAllocation memmove length In do_action()'s DeleteIndexEntryAllocation case, e->size comes from an on-disk INDEX_BUFFER entry. When e->size makes e + e->size point past hdr + hdr->used, PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) returns a negative ptrdiff_t that is silently cast to a quasi-infinite size_t when passed to memmove(). The memmove then walks past the destination buffer. The sibling DeleteIndexEntryRoot case at fslog.c:3540-3543 already carries the corresponding guard: if (PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) < esize || Add2Ptr(e, esize) > Add2Ptr(lrh, rec_len) || used + esize > le32_to_cpu(hdr->total)) { goto dirty_vol; } Apply the same shape to the allocation-path case. Also reject esize == 0: memmove(e, e, ...) is a no-op and leaves hdr->used unchanged, hiding a malformed entry from the existing check_index_header() walk. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 by mounting a crafted NTFS image: the unguarded memmove takes a length of 0xffffffffffffff00 and the kernel oopses in memmove+0x81/0x1a0 on the do_action+0x36a2 frame. [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72196 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound copy_lcns dp->page_lcns[] index in analysis pass In log_replay()'s analysis pass, after find_dp() returns a valid DIR_PAGE_ENTRY for the (target_attr, target_vcn) tuple, the copy_lcns block walks lrh->lcns_follow further entries: t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh->lcns_follow); for (i = 0; i < t16; i++) { size_t j = (size_t)(le64_to_cpu(lrh->target_vcn) - le64_to_cpu(dp->vcn)); dp->page_lcns[j + i] = lrh->page_lcns[i]; } find_dp() only validates that target_vcn falls within [dp->vcn, dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow), i.e., that the FIRST cluster is covered. The walk through the further entries is not bounded against dp->lcns_follow. For a malformed LRH where target_vcn = dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow - 1 and lrh->lcns_follow > 1, the i > 0 writes overflow the dp's allocated page_lcns[] array. Add the missing j + lrh->lcns_follow <= dp->lcns_follow guard. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 as a slab-out-of-bounds write of size 8 from log_replay+0x68d4 on the mount path. This is distinct from Pavitra Jha's 2026-05-02 patch ("fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion", <20260502154252.164586-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com>) which addresses the separate version-0 dirty-page-table conversion path's memmove(&dp->vcn, ...) call. The two fixes are complementary; both should land. [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes, fixed conflicts] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72195 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound attr_off in UpdateResidentValue against data_off In do_action()'s UpdateResidentValue case (fslog.c:3307), lrh->attr_off and lrh->redo_len come from the on-disk LRH. When they satisfy aoff + dlen < attr->res.data_off, the assignment attr->res.data_size = cpu_to_le32(aoff + dlen - data_off); underflows to ~4 GiB (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9 when aoff=0x10, dlen=1, data_off=0x18). Subsequent code that reads attr->res.data_size to walk the resident attribute payload would then read up to 4 GiB past the 1024-byte MFT record allocation. The existing mi_enum_attr() defense in fs/ntfs3/record.c:287 catches the corrupted data_size on the next attribute walk and fails the mount, but only on the path that walks all attributes. A read site that picks an attribute by name and reads its data_size without re-validating is not covered. Validate aoff against data_off and asize at the source. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via pr_warn-only probe: with aoff=0x10 and data_off=0x18, the post-assignment data_size is 0xfffffff9 (mount then fails at -22 from mi_enum_attr). [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72194 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: add depth limit to indx_find_buffer to prevent stack overflow indx_find_buffer() recursively descends the B+ tree index with no depth limit. A crafted NTFS image with circular index node references causes unbounded recursion, overflowing the kernel stack and panicking the system. This is reachable by mounting a malicious NTFS filesystem (e.g. from a USB drive via desktop automount) and deleting a file whose index entry triggers the rebalancing fallback path in indx_delete_entry(). Add a depth parameter and bail out with -EINVAL when it reaches the fnd->nodes array bound, matching the constraint already enforced by fnd_push() in indx_find(). The related function indx_find() was previously patched for a similar infinite-loop issue (commit 1732053c8a6b), but indx_find_buffer() was missed. | ||||