| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In Eclipse iceoryx-rs, versions 0.0.11 to 0.0.13 and 0.1.0 as well as on the latest main branch.
`SampleReceiver::<T>::take()` and `Sample::<T>::deref()` are safe functions that hand the caller a `&T` pointing at a chunk written by another iceoryx process, but the subscriber path neither requires `T: ShmSend` nor verifies that the received chunk is at least `size_of::<T>()` bytes / `align_of::<T>()`-aligned. A peer process that publishes an undersized chunk, or any chunk at all when the subscriber chose a pointer-bearing `T`, drives a `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` subscriber into out-of-bounds reads of adjacent shared-memory chunks or dereference of a publisher-controlled pointer.
Resolution:
It will not be fixed since this is a known limitation in iceoryx as it is the users responsibility to specify the same data type on sender and receiver side.
[iceoryx2](https://github.com/eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx2) is the successor of iceoryx-rs where the API is designed to prevent this by default.
It is strongly recommended to migrate to iceoryx2 which is actively maintained and receives security support.
The iceoryx-rs package has officially reached End-of-life and will not receive any features, bugfixes or security fixes. |
| When message history is serialized and loaded again, a tool result that contains a JSON object in the serialized shape of one of Pydantic AI's file types is rebuilt as that file. A third party who controls data a tool returns, such as a record that an MCP server or a function tool returns from an external system, can use this to make the application download a URL on its local network, or make the model provider read an s3:// object or uploaded file with the application's credentials. Applications are affected when tool results can contain third-party data, message history containing those results is serialized and loaded again (stored history, history a UI adapter holds on the server, or Temporal, DBOS or Prefect durable execution), and the model is one Pydantic AI downloads files for, one that honors force_download, or one whose provider resolves non-HTTP file URLs or uploaded files. History that a client submits through the Vercel AI or AG-UI adapter in the default mode is not affected. The issue is fixed in pydantic-ai and pydantic-ai-slim 1.107.10 and 2.66.0. |
| Multiple protocol dissector crashes in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service |
| Netatalk is a Free and Open Source file server suite for Unix-like operating systems. From 3.1.0 until 4.5.2, sl_createCNIDArray in etc/afpd/spotlight.c assumes every element of kMDQueryItemArray points to an eight-byte uint64_t and copies sizeof(uint64_t) bytes from the indexed p->dd_talloc_array element without validating the element's talloc type or allocation size. An authenticated AFP client with access to a Spotlight-enabled volume can use FPSpotlightRPC to supply a mixed-type sl_array_t containing a shorter boolean, nil, or string element, and an unauthenticated client can reach the same path when the optional guest UAM and a guest-accessible volume are enabled. The resulting eight-byte read extends beyond the shorter element's heap allocation and supplies an internal CNID filter; no confidentiality channel, write primitive, or code execution was demonstrated, while a production crash would require additional heap placement conditions. The container-type validation added for CVE-2023-42464 does not validate each element inside an accepted sl_array_t and therefore does not resolve this issue. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.2. |
| PROFINET protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service |
| USB-PTP protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 allows denial of service |
| Quasar before 2.35.3 contains a DOM clobbering vulnerability that allows attackers to break native wrapper detection by injecting HTML elements named Capacitor, cordova, or StatusBar. Attackers can place markup such as a div with id Capacitor into server-rendered or pre-rendered HTML so app.use(Quasar) throws and the application never mounts, or openURL() and AddressbarColor.set() throw. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/rmap: handle device-exclusive entries in folio_referenced_one()
page_vma_mapped_walk() can return non-present device-exclusive entries,
but folio_referenced_one() passes them to PTE young-bit accessors that
require present PTEs.
We must neither call clear_flush_young_ptes_notify() nor
folio_pte_batch() with non-present entries. For example, clearing the
young bit on non-present PTEs can corrupt the entry: on arm64
PTE_AF overlaps the swap type, so clearing it turns a device-exclusive
entry into an ordinary swap entry.
folio_pte_batch() will VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO.
Apply the same approach as the previous fixes to e.g., damon_ptep_mkold():
treat these entries as old from the CPU's perspective and obtain their
young state through the MMU notifier.
Skip PTE batching and MGLRU look-around for non-present entries, and
don't modify non-present PTEs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem: make shmem_file() check the file's inode
shmem_file() only checks if file->f_mapping is a shmem mapping. This
mapping can belong to another file, however, as with a Coda file backed
by a tmpfs container after mmap().
So it does not guarantee that the file inode is an actual shmem inode.
Seal handling and memfd preservation use this check before accessing
shmem inode state, so they can access an inode of the wrong type.
Let's make shmem_file() check the inode's file operations instead, to
identify shmem inodes reliably. This will identify regular shmem inodes,
including memfds and ordinary tmpfs files, independently of wrapper file
operations.
Use shmem_mapping() in collapse_file() instead to not change the behavior
of collapse_file(): it operates on the page cache and uses mapping->host
for shmem inode operations. Focusing on the file does not seem relevant. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/9p/usbg: remove bogus context initialization in alloc_requests
alloc_requests() initializes usb9pfs->in_req->context to point at the
struct f_usb9pfs instance itself. usb9pfs_queue_tx() later overwrites
this with the real struct p9_req_t pointer before every transmit, and
usb9pfs_tx_complete() clears it back to NULL after each completion, so
in_req->context only ever holds a valid p9_req_t once a request has
actually been queued.
usb9pfs_clear_tx(), however, can run at any time (mount close, gadget
disable) independent of whether a request was ever queued. If it runs
before the first usb9pfs_transmit(), it reads the leftover sentinel
value, type-confuses the struct f_usb9pfs pointer as a struct
p9_req_t, and both writes through it (req->t_err = -ECONNRESET) and
hands it to p9_client_cb(), which manipulates req->wq and req->refcount
at bogus offsets inside f_usb9pfs. This reliably corrupts memory or
panics whenever the transport is torn down before any 9p request has
been transmitted, e.g. mounting and immediately unmounting, or a cable
disconnect racing the very first request.
usb9pfs->out_req->context is set the same way but is never read by
this transport (usb9pfs_rx_complete() identifies the instance via
ep->driver_data instead), so it serves no purpose either.
Both endpoints' ->driver_data are already set to usb9pfs in
enable_endpoint(), which is what the completion handlers actually use
to recover the f_usb9pfs instance. Just drop the leftover
->context assignments; usb_ep_alloc_request()/alloc_ep_req() already
return zeroed requests, so in_req->context correctly starts out NULL. |
| GPAC before 26.07.0 contains a type confusion vulnerability in xmt_parse_script_field() that allows attackers to trigger a heap out-of-bounds read via duplicate Script field names with conflicting types. Attackers can craft an XMT file that, when imported with MP4Box, causes gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset() to treat a single-value field as multi-value, crashing the application. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vduse: fix VA/PA confusion in the coherent page fault path
vduse_domain_get_coherent_page() assumes that iotlb entries above
bounce_size were installed by vduse_domain_alloc_coherent(), so it
treats map->addr as a physical address. But vduse registers with
use_va = true, and when the device is bound to vhost_vdpa,
vhost_vdpa_va_map() stores a userspace virtual address in map->addr,
which vduse_domain_set_map() then copies into the same iotlb. A
process holding the domain file descriptor across a rebind can
therefore fault in an arbitrary physical page with read/write
access, ignoring the entry permissions.
Additionally, since the domain file mmap lacks VM_IO, the domain
file itself can be mapped and passed to vhost_vdpa_va_map(),
producing self-referential entries that bypass the coherent path
check.
To fix, only translate entries whose backing file is the domain
file itself in vduse_domain_get_coherent_page(), reject such
entries in vduse_domain_set_map() since only external mappings
should be imported, and set VM_IO on the domain file mmap so
vhost_vdpa_va_map() refuses to map it in the first place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (lm87) Fix drvdata type confusion in vrm_show() and vrm_store()
When an LM87 or ADM1024 device is probed with VID support enabled, reading
from or writing to the vrm sysfs attribute triggers a driver data type
confusion in vrm_show() and vrm_store() in drivers/hwmon/lm87.c.
In lm87_probe(), the driver stores the struct lm87_data pointer on the I2C
client via i2c_set_clientdata() and passes the struct i2c_client pointer as
the drvdata argument to devm_hwmon_device_register_with_groups(), which
attaches the attribute groups to the registered hwmon device with client as
its driver_data. Unlike the other sysfs callbacks that retrieve client via
dev_get_drvdata() and then obtain data via i2c_get_clientdata(), vrm_show()
and vrm_store() assign dev_get_drvdata(dev) directly to struct lm87_data *.
Dereferencing data->vrm therefore accesses the struct i2c_client instance
at offsetof(struct lm87_data, vrm), causing vrm_show() to leak an unrelated
byte from struct i2c_client to userspace and vrm_store() to corrupt a byte
within struct i2c_client while failing to update the actual VRM value.
Fix the problem by assigning the return value from dev_get_drvdata(dev) to
struct i2c_client *client and using i2c_get_clientdata() to get the actual
client data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/chrome: cros_usbpd_notify: Only use drvdata when parent is GOOG0004
cros_usbpd_notify_probe_acpi() takes the EC device pointer from
dev_get_drvdata(dev->parent) and assumes it is a struct cros_ec_device.
That only holds when GOOG0003 is a child of GOOG0004. On older devices
without that hierarchy, such as Google Nami, GOOG0003 and GOOG0004 are
siblings under the ACPI EC (PNP0C09):
PNP0C09:00 (acpi-ec)
|-- GOOG0003:00 (cros-usbpd-notify-acpi)
`-- GOOG0004:00 (cros_ec_lpcs)
Before commit db65a06d10b3 ("ACPI: EC: Convert the driver to a platform
one") the parent platform device had no driver data, so the driver
warned and continued without an EC pointer, as intended for these
devices. Since that commit the ACPI EC driver stores its struct acpi_ec
there, so the driver treats a struct acpi_ec as a struct cros_ec_device
and calls cros_ec_cmd() on it for every USB-C PD host event. Plugging
or unplugging a charger then intermittently oopses, followed by soft
lockups and a hung system:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff9cf03220
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
Hardware name: Google Nami/Nami, BIOS 09/19/2019
Workqueue: kacpi_notify acpi_os_execute_deferred
RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x29d/0x330
Call Trace:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x59/0x80
__mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x129/0x930
cros_ec_cmd_xfer+0x2a/0xf0 [cros_ec_proto]
cros_ec_cmd_xfer_status+0x1a/0x90 [cros_ec_proto]
cros_ec_cmd+0xb7/0x140 [cros_ec_proto]
cros_usbpd_get_event_and_notify+0x42/0xc0 [cros_usbpd_notify]
acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x4e/0x70
acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x1a/0x30
Only read the parent's driver data when the parent's ACPI node is
GOOG0004, and otherwise continue without an EC pointer. While at it,
drop the reference taken by fwnode_get_parent(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: split huge PUDs when adjusting VMA boundaries
PFN mappings such as VFIO PCI BAR mappings can use PUD leaves while
allowing VMA splits at page granularity. However, vma_adjust_trans_huge()
only handles PMDs.
After faulting a writable PUD-sized VFIO BAR mapping, changing its first
page to read-only with mprotect() makes the PMD walk treat the PUD leaf
as a PMD table. Applying MADV_DONTFORK to the first PMD-sized chunk leaves
the PUD spanning two VMAs: the PMD-aligned boundary skips splitting.
Walk the page tables once at each adjusted boundary and split a huge
PUD or PMD leaf as needed. Handle PUD leaves even when the boundary is
PMD-aligned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vma: call ->may_split() before a partial merge
A driver can use the ->may_split() hook to forbid a VMA boundary at
certain addresses.
A device-dax device is a character device that gives raw access to a
range of memory through mmap(). device-dax refuses any address that is not
a multiple of the device's alignment through vm_ops->may_split.
vma_merge_existing_range() can move boundaries, but does not call
vm_ops->may_split.
If a range at the edge of a VMA gets the attributes of the adjacent VMA,
the function moves only that range over to the neighbour: one VMA shrinks
and the other grows. This is a partial merge, and vma_modify() tries it
before any split.
Take a device-dax VMA that lies next to another VMA of the same file.
The user calls mprotect() on the one page of the first VMA that touches
the second VMA, and asks for the protection that the second VMA already
has. The result is a partial merge. It puts the boundary inside a 1 GiB
mapping, which is a single leaf entry at the PUD level.
As part of the merge, the kernel looks for a huge PMD to split at the
new boundary. That code does not expect a PUD leaf:
vma_merge_existing_range()
commit_merge()
vma_adjust_trans_huge()
split_huge_pmd_address()
mm_find_pmd()
treats the PUD leaf as a pointer to a PMD table,
so the "table" is the device memory that the leaf maps
__split_huge_pmd()
reads a PMD that the user wrote to the device memory
folio_put() on the folio that this PMD names
Bad. While the code must at some point be taught to split PUD entries as
well, the issue here is that we move VMA boundaries such that they are
incompatible with the driver.
Fix this by calling ->may_split() on the address that a partial merge
would move the boundary to, and by abandoning the merge if the driver
refuses. vma_modify() then tries the split, which fails with -EINVAL.
Factor out existing split handling into check_split() and reuse it.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private.
[ david: improve description; cleanup the code ] |
| Access of resource using incompatible type ('type confusion') in Windows Shell allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Wasmtime 47.0.0 before 48.0.8, 49.0.0 before 49.0.5, and 50.0.0 before 50.0.1 contains a cross-engine type confusion vulnerability because StructType::with_finality_and_supertype does not validate that the supplied supertype belongs to the same Engine. Embedders using multiple engines that create a GC struct type with another engine's supertype can trigger runtime panics or GC heap corruption, causing denial of service; guest WebAssembly cannot trigger it. |
| littlefs through 2.11.3, when built with LFS_MIGRATE, contains a type confusion vulnerability in lfs_dir_traverse() that treats a stack lfs_diskoff struct as an lfs_attr array. Attackers can supply a crafted littlefs v1 image whose metadata is read as LFS_FROM_USERATTRS during migration, causing out-of-bounds stack reads and process crashes. |
| Access of resource using incompatible type ('type confusion') vulnerability in Samsung Open Source Starfish allows Input Data Manipulation. |