| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hinic: avoid kernel hung in hinic_get_stats64()
When using hinic device as a bond slave device, and reading device stats
of master bond device, the kernel may hung.
The kernel panic calltrace as follows:
Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks
Call trace:
native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x1ec/0x31c
dev_get_stats+0x60/0xcc
dev_seq_printf_stats+0x40/0x120
dev_seq_show+0x1c/0x40
seq_read_iter+0x3c8/0x4dc
seq_read+0xe0/0x130
proc_reg_read+0xa8/0xe0
vfs_read+0xb0/0x1d4
ksys_read+0x70/0xfc
__arm64_sys_read+0x20/0x30
el0_svc_common+0x88/0x234
do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x90
el0_svc+0x1c/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0
el0_sync+0x148/0x180
And the calltrace of task that actually caused kernel hungs as follows:
__switch_to+124
__schedule+548
schedule+72
schedule_timeout+348
__down_common+188
__down+24
down+104
hinic_get_stats64+44 [hinic]
dev_get_stats+92
bond_get_stats+172 [bonding]
dev_get_stats+92
dev_seq_printf_stats+60
dev_seq_show+24
seq_read_iter+964
seq_read+220
proc_reg_read+164
vfs_read+172
ksys_read+108
__arm64_sys_read+28
el0_svc_common+132
do_el0_svc+40
el0_svc+24
el0_sync_handler+164
el0_sync+324
When getting device stats from bond, kernel will call bond_get_stats().
It first holds the spinlock bond->stats_lock, and then call
hinic_get_stats64() to collect hinic device's stats.
However, hinic_get_stats64() calls `down(&nic_dev->mgmt_lock)` to
protect its critical section, which may schedule current task out.
And if system is under high pressure, the task cannot be woken up
immediately, which eventually triggers kernel hung panic.
Since previous patch has replaced hinic_dev.tx_stats/rx_stats with local
variable in hinic_get_stats64(), there is nothing need to be protected
by lock, so just removing down()/up() is ok. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/mdp5: Fix global state lock backoff
We need to grab the lock after the early return for !hwpipe case.
Otherwise, we could have hit contention yet still returned 0.
Fixes an issue that the new CONFIG_DRM_DEBUG_MODESET_LOCK stuff flagged
in CI:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 282 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modeset_lock.c:296 drm_modeset_lock+0xf8/0x154
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 282 Comm: kms_cursor_lega Tainted: G W 5.19.0-rc2-15930-g875cc8bc536a #1
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. DB820c (DT)
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : drm_modeset_lock+0xf8/0x154
lr : drm_atomic_get_private_obj_state+0x84/0x170
sp : ffff80000cfab6a0
x29: ffff80000cfab6a0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff000083bc4d00
x26: 0000000000000038 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff80000957ca58
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff000081ace080 x21: 0000000000000001
x20: ffff000081acec18 x19: ffff80000cfabb80 x18: 0000000000000038
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: fffffffffffea0d0
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 284e4f5f4e524157 x12: 5f534b434f4c5f47
x11: ffff80000a386aa8 x10: 0000000000000029 x9 : ffff80000cfab610
x8 : 0000000000000029 x7 : 0000000000000014 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : ffff8000081ad904 x3 : 0000000000000029
x2 : ffff0000801db4c0 x1 : ffff80000cfabb80 x0 : ffff000081aceb58
Call trace:
drm_modeset_lock+0xf8/0x154
drm_atomic_get_private_obj_state+0x84/0x170
mdp5_get_global_state+0x54/0x6c
mdp5_pipe_release+0x2c/0xd4
mdp5_plane_atomic_check+0x2ec/0x414
drm_atomic_helper_check_planes+0xd8/0x210
drm_atomic_helper_check+0x54/0xb0
...
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
drm_modeset_lock attempting to lock a contended lock without backoff:
drm_modeset_lock+0x148/0x154
mdp5_get_global_state+0x30/0x6c
mdp5_pipe_release+0x2c/0xd4
mdp5_plane_atomic_check+0x290/0x414
drm_atomic_helper_check_planes+0xd8/0x210
drm_atomic_helper_check+0x54/0xb0
drm_atomic_check_only+0x4b0/0x8f4
drm_atomic_commit+0x68/0xe0
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/492701/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: mt76x02u: fix possible memory leak in __mt76x02u_mcu_send_msg
Free the skb if mt76u_bulk_msg fails in __mt76x02u_mcu_send_msg routine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kunit: executor: Fix a memory leak on failure in kunit_filter_tests
It's possible that memory allocation for 'filtered' will fail, but for the
copy of the suite to succeed. In this case, the copy could be leaked.
Properly free 'copy' in the error case for the allocation of 'filtered'
failing.
Note that there may also have been a similar issue in
kunit_filter_subsuites, before it was removed in "kunit: flatten
kunit_suite*** to kunit_suite** in .kunit_test_suites".
This was reported by clang-analyzer via the kernel test robot, here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/c8073b8e-7b9e-0830-4177-87c12f16349c@intel.com/
And by smatch via Dan Carpenter and the kernel test robot:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/202207101328.ASjx88yj-lkp@intel.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Handle buffer mapping fail correctly in perf_mmap()
After successful allocation of a buffer or a successful attachment to an
existing buffer perf_mmap() tries to map the buffer read only into the page
table. If that fails, the already set up page table entries are zapped, but
the other perf specific side effects of that failure are not handled. The
calling code just cleans up the VMA and does not invoke perf_mmap_close().
This leaks reference counts, corrupts user->vm accounting and also results
in an unbalanced invocation of event::event_mapped().
Cure this by moving the event::event_mapped() invocation before the
map_range() call so that on map_range() failure perf_mmap_close() can be
invoked without causing an unbalanced event::event_unmapped() call.
perf_mmap_close() undoes the reference counts and eventually frees buffers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86/intel/pmt: fix a crashlog NULL pointer access
Usage of the intel_pmt_read() for binary sysfs, requires a pcidev. The
current use of the endpoint value is only valid for telemetry endpoint
usage.
Without the ep, the crashlog usage causes the following NULL pointer
exception:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:intel_pmt_read+0x3b/0x70 [pmt_class]
Code:
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? sysfs_kf_bin_read+0xc0/0xe0
kernfs_fop_read_iter+0xac/0x1a0
vfs_read+0x26d/0x350
ksys_read+0x6b/0xe0
__x64_sys_read+0x1d/0x30
x64_sys_call+0x1bc8/0x1d70
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x110
Augment struct intel_pmt_entry with a pointer to the pcidev to avoid
the NULL pointer exception. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uvc: Initialize frame-based format color matching descriptor
Fix NULL pointer crash in uvcg_framebased_make due to uninitialized color
matching descriptor for frame-based format which was added in
commit f5e7bdd34aca ("usb: gadget: uvc: Allow creating new color matching
descriptors") that added handling for uncompressed and mjpeg format.
Crash is seen when userspace configuration (via configfs) does not
explicitly define the color matching descriptor. If color_matching is not
found, config_group_find_item() returns NULL. The code then jumps to
out_put_cm, where it calls config_item_put(color_matching);. If
color_matching is NULL, this will dereference a null pointer, leading to a
crash.
[ 2.746440] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000008c
[ 2.756273] Mem abort info:
[ 2.760080] ESR = 0x0000000096000005
[ 2.764872] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 2.771068] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 2.771069] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 2.771070] FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
[ 2.771071] Data abort info:
[ 2.771072] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 2.771073] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 2.771074] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 2.771075] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000a3e59000
[ 2.771077] [000000000000008c] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
[ 2.771081] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 2.771084] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 2.771085] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 2.771138] CPU: 7 PID: 486 Comm: ln Tainted: G W E 6.6.58-android15
[ 2.771139] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SunP QRD HDK (DT)
[ 2.771140] pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 2.771141] pc : __uvcg_fill_strm+0x198/0x2cc
[ 2.771145] lr : __uvcg_iter_strm_cls+0xc8/0x17c
[ 2.771146] sp : ffffffc08140bbb0
[ 2.771146] x29: ffffffc08140bbb0 x28: ffffff803bc81380 x27: ffffff8023bbd250
[ 2.771147] x26: ffffff8023bbd250 x25: ffffff803c361348 x24: ffffff803d8e6768
[ 2.771148] x23: 0000000000000004 x22: 0000000000000003 x21: ffffffc08140bc48
[ 2.771149] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffc08140bc48 x18: ffffffe9f8cf4a00
[ 2.771150] x17: 000000001bf64ec3 x16: 000000001bf64ec3 x15: ffffff8023bbd250
[ 2.771151] x14: 000000000000000f x13: 004c4b40000f4240 x12: 000a2c2a00051615
[ 2.771152] x11: 000000000000004f x10: ffffffe9f76b40ec x9 : ffffffe9f7e389d0
[ 2.771153] x8 : ffffff803d0d31ce x7 : 000f4240000a2c2a x6 : 0005161500028b0a
[ 2.771154] x5 : ffffff803d0d31ce x4 : 0000000000000003 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 2.771155] x2 : ffffffc08140bc50 x1 : ffffffc08140bc48 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 2.771156] Call trace:
[ 2.771157] __uvcg_fill_strm+0x198/0x2cc
[ 2.771157] __uvcg_iter_strm_cls+0xc8/0x17c
[ 2.771158] uvcg_streaming_class_allow_link+0x240/0x290
[ 2.771159] configfs_symlink+0x1f8/0x630
[ 2.771161] vfs_symlink+0x114/0x1a0
[ 2.771163] do_symlinkat+0x94/0x28c
[ 2.771164] __arm64_sys_symlinkat+0x54/0x70
[ 2.771164] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x114
[ 2.771166] el0_svc_common+0x80/0xe0
[ 2.771168] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[ 2.771169] el0_svc+0x3c/0x70
[ 2.771172] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xbc
[ 2.771173] el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac
Initialize color matching descriptor for frame-based format to prevent
NULL pointer crash by mirroring the handling done for uncompressed and
mjpeg formats. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: apple: validate feature-report field count to prevent NULL pointer dereference
A malicious HID device with quirk APPLE_MAGIC_BACKLIGHT can trigger a NULL
pointer dereference whilst the power feature-report is toggled and sent to
the device in apple_magic_backlight_report_set(). The power feature-report
is expected to have two data fields, but if the descriptor declares one
field then accessing field[1] and dereferencing it in
apple_magic_backlight_report_set() becomes invalid
since field[1] will be NULL.
An example of a minimal descriptor which can cause the crash is something
like the following where the report with ID 3 (power report) only
references a single 1-byte field. When hid core parses the descriptor it
will encounter the final feature tag, allocate a hid_report (all members
of field[] will be zeroed out), create field structure and populate it,
increasing the maxfield to 1. The subsequent field[1] access and
dereference causes the crash.
Usage Page (Vendor Defined 0xFF00)
Usage (0x0F)
Collection (Application)
Report ID (1)
Usage (0x01)
Logical Minimum (0)
Logical Maximum (255)
Report Size (8)
Report Count (1)
Feature (Data,Var,Abs)
Usage (0x02)
Logical Maximum (32767)
Report Size (16)
Report Count (1)
Feature (Data,Var,Abs)
Report ID (3)
Usage (0x03)
Logical Minimum (0)
Logical Maximum (1)
Report Size (8)
Report Count (1)
Feature (Data,Var,Abs)
End Collection
Here we see the KASAN splat when the kernel dereferences the
NULL pointer and crashes:
[ 15.164723] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 15.165691] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
[ 15.165691] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 10 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.15.0 #31 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 15.165691] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
[ 15.165691] RIP: 0010:apple_magic_backlight_report_set+0xbf/0x210
[ 15.165691] Call Trace:
[ 15.165691] <TASK>
[ 15.165691] apple_probe+0x571/0xa20
[ 15.165691] hid_device_probe+0x2e2/0x6f0
[ 15.165691] really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0
[ 15.165691] __driver_probe_device+0x24f/0x310
[ 15.165691] driver_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0
[ 15.165691] __device_attach_driver+0x169/0x220
[ 15.165691] bus_for_each_drv+0x118/0x1b0
[ 15.165691] __device_attach+0x1d5/0x380
[ 15.165691] device_initial_probe+0x12/0x20
[ 15.165691] bus_probe_device+0x13d/0x180
[ 15.165691] device_add+0xd87/0x1510
[...]
To fix this issue we should validate the number of fields that the
backlight and power reports have and if they do not have the required
number of fields then bail. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: avoid ref leak in nfsd_open_local_fh()
If two calls to nfsd_open_local_fh() race and both successfully call
nfsd_file_acquire_local(), they will both get an extra reference to the
net to accompany the file reference stored in *pnf.
One of them will fail to store (using xchg()) the file reference in
*pnf and will drop that reference but WON'T drop the accompanying
reference to the net. This leak means that when the nfs server is shut
down it will hang in nfsd_shutdown_net() waiting for
&nn->nfsd_net_free_done.
This patch adds the missing nfsd_net_put(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: unlink NAPIs from queues on error to open
CI hit a UaF in fbnic in the AF_XDP portion of the queues.py test.
The UaF is in the __sk_mark_napi_id_once() call in xsk_bind(),
NAPI has been freed. Looks like the device failed to open earlier,
and we lack clearing the NAPI pointer from the queue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix inode use after free in ext4_end_io_rsv_work()
In ext4_io_end_defer_completion(), check if io_end->list_vec is empty to
avoid adding an io_end that requires no conversion to the
i_rsv_conversion_list, which in turn prevents starting an unnecessary
worker. An ext4_emergency_state() check is also added to avoid attempting
to abort the journal in an emergency state.
Additionally, ext4_put_io_end_defer() is refactored to call
ext4_io_end_defer_completion() directly instead of being open-coded.
This also prevents starting an unnecessary worker when EXT4_IO_END_FAILED
is set but data_err=abort is not enabled.
This ensures that the check in ext4_put_io_end_defer() is consistent with
the check in ext4_end_bio(). Otherwise, we might add an io_end to the
i_rsv_conversion_list and then call ext4_finish_bio(), after which the
inode could be freed before ext4_end_io_rsv_work() is called, triggering
a use-after-free issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
neighbour: Fix null-ptr-deref in neigh_flush_dev().
kernel test robot reported null-ptr-deref in neigh_flush_dev(). [0]
The cited commit introduced per-netdev neighbour list and converted
neigh_flush_dev() to use it instead of the global hash table.
One thing we missed is that neigh_table_clear() calls neigh_ifdown()
with NULL dev.
Let's restore the hash table iteration.
Note that IPv6 module is no longer unloadable, so neigh_table_clear()
is called only when IPv6 fails to initialise, which is unlikely to
happen.
[0]:
IPv6: Attempt to unregister permanent protocol 136
IPv6: Attempt to unregister permanent protocol 17
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000001a0: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000d00-0x0000000000000d07]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G T 6.12.0-rc6-01246-gf7f52738637f #1
Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:neigh_flush_dev.llvm.6395807810224103582+0x52/0x570
Code: c1 e8 03 42 8a 04 38 84 c0 0f 85 15 05 00 00 31 c0 41 83 3e 0a 0f 94 c0 48 8d 1c c3 48 81 c3 f8 0c 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 38 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 f7 49 93 fe 4c 8b 3b 4d 85 ff 0f
RSP: 0000:ffff88810026f408 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 00000000000001a0 RBX: 0000000000000d00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffc0631640
RBP: ffff88810026f470 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc0625250 R14: ffffffffc0631640 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f575cb83940(0000) GS:ffff8883aee00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f575db40008 CR3: 00000002bf936000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__neigh_ifdown.llvm.6395807810224103582+0x44/0x390
neigh_table_clear+0xb1/0x268
ndisc_cleanup+0x21/0x38 [ipv6]
init_module+0x2f5/0x468 [ipv6]
do_one_initcall+0x1ba/0x628
do_init_module+0x21a/0x530
load_module+0x2550/0x2ea0
__se_sys_finit_module+0x3d2/0x620
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x76/0x88
x64_sys_call+0x7ff/0xde8
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x1e8
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
RIP: 0033:0x7f575d6f2719
Code: 08 89 e8 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d b7 06 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff82a2a268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557827b45310 RCX: 00007f575d6f2719
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f575d584efd RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f575d584efd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000557827b47b00
R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000557827b470e0 R15: 00007f575dbb4270
</TASK>
Modules linked in: ipv6(+) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: gpib: fix unset padding field copy back to userspace
The introduction of a padding field in the gpib_board_info_ioctl is
showing up as initialized data on the stack frame being copyied back
to userspace in function board_info_ioctl. The simplest fix is to
initialize the entire struct to zero to ensure all unassigned padding
fields are zero'd before being copied back to userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Avoid accessing uninitialized arvif->ar during beacon miss
During beacon miss handling, ath12k driver iterates over active virtual
interfaces (vifs) and attempts to access the radio object (ar) via
arvif->deflink->ar.
However, after commit aa80f12f3bed ("wifi: ath12k: defer vdev creation for
MLO"), arvif is linked to a radio only after vdev creation, typically when
a channel is assigned or a scan is requested.
For P2P capable devices, a default P2P interface is created by
wpa_supplicant along with regular station interfaces, these serve as dummy
interfaces for P2P-capable stations, lack an associated netdev and initiate
frequent scans to discover neighbor p2p devices. When a scan is initiated
on such P2P vifs, driver selects destination radio (ar) based on scan
frequency, creates a scan vdev, and attaches arvif to the radio. Once the
scan completes or is aborted, the scan vdev is deleted, detaching arvif
from the radio and leaving arvif->ar uninitialized.
While handling beacon miss for station interfaces, P2P interface is also
encountered in the vif iteration and ath12k_mac_handle_beacon_miss_iter()
tries to dereference the uninitialized arvif->deflink->ar.
Fix this by verifying that vdev is created for the arvif before accessing
its ar during beacon miss handling and similar vif iterator callbacks.
==========================================================================
wlp6s0: detected beacon loss from AP (missed 7 beacons) - probing
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-wt-ath+ #2 PREEMPT(full)
RIP: 0010:ath12k_mac_handle_beacon_miss_iter+0xb5/0x1a0 [ath12k]
Call Trace:
__iterate_interfaces+0x11a/0x410 [mac80211]
ieee80211_iterate_active_interfaces_atomic+0x61/0x140 [mac80211]
ath12k_mac_handle_beacon_miss+0xa1/0xf0 [ath12k]
ath12k_roam_event+0x393/0x560 [ath12k]
ath12k_wmi_op_rx+0x1486/0x28c0 [ath12k]
ath12k_htc_process_trailer.isra.0+0x2fb/0x620 [ath12k]
ath12k_htc_rx_completion_handler+0x448/0x830 [ath12k]
ath12k_ce_recv_process_cb+0x549/0x9e0 [ath12k]
ath12k_ce_per_engine_service+0xbe/0xf0 [ath12k]
ath12k_pci_ce_workqueue+0x69/0x120 [ath12k]
process_one_work+0xe3a/0x1430
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c5-00284.1-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinmux: fix race causing mux_owner NULL with active mux_usecount
commit 5a3e85c3c397 ("pinmux: Use sequential access to access
desc->pinmux data") tried to address the issue when two client of the
same gpio calls pinctrl_select_state() for the same functionality, was
resulting in NULL pointer issue while accessing desc->mux_owner.
However, issue was not completely fixed due to the way it was handled
and it can still result in the same NULL pointer.
The issue occurs due to the following interleaving:
cpu0 (process A) cpu1 (process B)
pin_request() { pin_free() {
mutex_lock()
desc->mux_usecount--; //becomes 0
..
mutex_unlock()
mutex_lock(desc->mux)
desc->mux_usecount++; // becomes 1
desc->mux_owner = owner;
mutex_unlock(desc->mux)
mutex_lock(desc->mux)
desc->mux_owner = NULL;
mutex_unlock(desc->mux)
This sequence leads to a state where the pin appears to be in use
(`mux_usecount == 1`) but has no owner (`mux_owner == NULL`), which can
cause NULL pointer on next pin_request on the same pin.
Ensure that updates to mux_usecount and mux_owner are performed
atomically under the same lock. Only clear mux_owner when mux_usecount
reaches zero and no new owner has been assigned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: imx95-blk-ctl: Fix synchronous abort
When enabling runtime PM for clock suppliers that also belong to a power
domain, the following crash is thrown:
error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : clk_mux_get_parent+0x60/0x90
lr : clk_core_reparent_orphans_nolock+0x58/0xd8
Call trace:
clk_mux_get_parent+0x60/0x90
clk_core_reparent_orphans_nolock+0x58/0xd8
of_clk_add_hw_provider.part.0+0x90/0x100
of_clk_add_hw_provider+0x1c/0x38
imx95_bc_probe+0x2e0/0x3f0
platform_probe+0x70/0xd8
Enabling runtime PM without explicitly resuming the device caused
the power domain cut off after clk_register() is called. As a result,
a crash happens when the clock hardware provider is added and attempts
to access the BLK_CTL register.
Fix this by using devm_pm_runtime_enable() instead of pm_runtime_enable()
and getting rid of the pm_runtime_disable() in the cleanup path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb: scarlett2: Fix missing NULL check
scarlett2_input_select_ctl_info() sets up the string arrays allocated
via kasprintf(), but it misses NULL checks, which may lead to NULL
dereference Oops. Let's add the proper NULL check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa/mlx5: Fix release of uninitialized resources on error path
The commit in the fixes tag made sure that mlx5_vdpa_free()
is the single entrypoint for removing the vdpa device resources
added in mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(), even in the cleanup path of
mlx5_vdpa_dev_add().
This means that all functions from mlx5_vdpa_free() should be able to
handle uninitialized resources. This was not the case though:
mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources() and mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx()
were not able to do so. This caused the splat below when adding
a vdpa device without a MAC address.
This patch fixes these remaining issues:
- Makes mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources() return early if called on
uninitialized resources.
- Moves mlx5_cmd_init_async_ctx() early on during device addition
because it can't fail. This means that mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx()
also can't fail. To mirror this, move the call site of
mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx() in mlx5_vdpa_free().
An additional comment was added in mlx5_vdpa_free() to document
the expectations of functions called from this context.
Splat:
mlx5_core 0000:b5:03.2: mlx5_vdpa_dev_add:3950:(pid 2306) warning: No mac address provisioned?
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 2306 at kernel/workqueue.c:4207 __flush_work+0x9a/0xb0
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __try_to_del_timer_sync+0x61/0x90
? __timer_delete_sync+0x2b/0x40
mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources+0x1c/0x40 [mlx5_vdpa]
mlx5_vdpa_free+0x45/0x160 [mlx5_vdpa]
vdpa_release_dev+0x1e/0x50 [vdpa]
device_release+0x31/0x90
kobject_cleanup+0x37/0x130
mlx5_vdpa_dev_add+0x327/0x890 [mlx5_vdpa]
vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x2c1/0x4d0 [vdpa]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd8/0x130
genl_family_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x220
? __pfx_vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x10/0x10 [vdpa]
genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0xa0
? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x27b/0x3b0
netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430
__sys_sendto+0x1fa/0x210
? ___pte_offset_map+0x17/0x160
? next_uptodate_folio+0x85/0x2b0
? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x51/0x90
? filemap_map_pages+0x515/0x660
__x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x2c0
? do_read_fault+0x108/0x220
? do_pte_missing+0x14a/0x3e0
? __handle_mm_fault+0x321/0x730
? count_memcg_events+0x13f/0x180
? handle_mm_fault+0x1fb/0x2d0
? do_user_addr_fault+0x20c/0x700
? syscall_exit_work+0x104/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f0c25b0feca
[...]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/pds: Fix missing detach_ioas op
When CONFIG_IOMMUFD is enabled and a device is bound to the pds_vfio_pci
driver, the following WARN_ON() trace is seen and probe fails:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5040 at drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c:317 __vfio_register_dev+0x130/0x140 [vfio]
<...>
pds_vfio_pci 0000:08:00.1: probe with driver pds_vfio_pci failed with error -22
This is because the driver's vfio_device_ops.detach_ioas isn't set.
Fix this by using the generic vfio_iommufd_physical_detach_ioas
function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: avoid NULL dereference when RX problematic packet on unsupported 6 GHz band
With a quite rare chance, RX report might be problematic to make SW think
a packet is received on 6 GHz band even if the chip does not support 6 GHz
band actually. Since SW won't initialize stuffs for unsupported bands, NULL
dereference will happen then in the sequence, rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter() ->
rtw89_core_cancel_6ghz_probe_tx(). So, add a check to avoid it.
The following is a crash log for this case.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000032
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 1907 Comm: irq/131-rtw89_p Tainted: G U 6.6.56-05896-g89f5fb0eb30b #1 (HASH:1400 4)
Hardware name: Google Telith/Telith, BIOS Google_Telith.15217.747.0 11/12/2024
RIP: 0010:rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter+0xd2/0x310 [rtw89_core]
Code: 4c 89 7d c8 48 89 55 c0 49 8d 44 24 02 48 89 45 b8 45 31 ff eb 11
41 c6 45 3a 01 41 b7 01 4d 8b 6d 00 4d 39 f5 74 42 8b 43 10 <41> 33 45
32 0f b7 4b 14 66 41 33 4d 36 0f b7 c9 09 c1 74 d8 4d 85
RSP: 0018:ffff9f3080138ca0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000b8bf5770 RBX: ffff91b5e8c639c0 RCX: 0000000000000011
RDX: ffff91b582de1be8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff91b5e8c639e6
RBP: ffff9f3080138d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff91b59de70000 R11: ffffffffc069be50 R12: ffff91b5e8c639e4
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff91b5828020b8 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff91b8efa40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000032 CR3: 00000002bf838000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? __die_body+0x68/0xb0
? page_fault_oops+0x379/0x3e0
? exc_page_fault+0x4f/0xa0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? __pfx_rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)]
? rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter+0xd2/0x310 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)]
__iterate_interfaces+0x59/0x110 [mac80211 (HASH:1400 6)]
? __pfx_rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)]
? __pfx_rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)]
ieee80211_iterate_active_interfaces_atomic+0x36/0x50 [mac80211 (HASH:1400 6)]
rtw89_core_rx_to_mac80211+0xfd/0x1b0 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)]
rtw89_core_rx+0x43a/0x980 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)] |
