| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Summary
Cloudflare tokio-quiche was found to contain an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in its HTTP/3 DATAGRAM handling. For every previously unseen flow identifier (quarter stream ID) received in a DATAGRAM frame, tokio-quiche creates and retains new, per-flow state. A remote peer can send DATAGRAMs with many distinct identifiers, causing the per-connection flow map and associated channel state to grow without bound.
Impact
Exploitation can exhaust process memory and cause a denial of service. The vulnerable code is used in both client and server configurations, so either role can be affected by a malicious peer. QUIC DATAGRAM support in tokio-quiche is enabled by default through QuicSettings::enable_dgram; applications can disable it by setting this field to false. The vulnerable HTTP/3 path is reachable only when DATAGRAM support is negotiated with the peer. Core quiche and HTTP/3 deployments without DATAGRAM support are not affected.
Mitigation
Disable DATAGRAMs in tokio-quiche’s QuicSettings::enable_dgram.
Remediation
Upgrade to tokio-quiche version 0.23.0 or later. The fixed code creates flow state only for valid DATAGRAM-capable request streams, which are bounded by QUIC’s stream limits. To tolerate packet reordering, servers retain early DATAGRAMs in a bounded, expiring buffer, while clients discard DATAGRAMs for unknown flows. |
| In Eclipse Kura version 5.0.0 to 5.6.2, the Web Console allocates a new HTTP session for every request to its built-in authentication endpoints (/admin/auth, /admin/login/password, /admin/login/cert) before checking the HTTP method, parsing the request, or validating any submitted credentials, and does not limit how many such sessions can be allocated. An unauthenticated client that sends requests to these endpoints without honoring the returned session cookie can cause the server to allocate an unbounded number of sessions, exhausting the JVM heap and crashing the Kura process. |
| SharpIppNext is a .NET Standard library for building Internet Printing Protocol clients and servers. Prior to 4.1.0, server-side SharpIppNext implementations using SharpIppServer.ReceiveRequestAsync or SharpIppServer.ReceiveRawRequestAsync pass incoming data to IppProtocol.ReadIppRequestAsync in SharpIpp/Protocol/IppProtocol.cs, where ReadDocumentStream is enabled by default and the remaining document body is copied with CopyToAsync into a MemoryStream without a size limit. An unauthenticated remote client can send an arbitrarily large IPP document body, exhausting process memory and causing an out-of-memory failure or service termination. Client-only implementations using SharpIppClient are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.0. |
| Latvijas Valsts radio un televīzijas centrs (LVRTC)
eParakstītājs 3.0 version 1.10.0-resolute allows an unauthenticated remote
attacker to cause HTTP GET requests from a user's workstation by convincing the
user to open a crafted signed eDOC file. Automatic certificate validation
retrieves a signer-controlled Authority Information Access (AIA) caIssuers URL
and follows redirects without restricting the destination, enabling blind SSRF
to loopback and private-network services. Additionally, unrestricted loading of
local file URIs (such as file:///dev/zero) causes unbounded memory buffering
resulting in Denial of Service (OutOfMemoryError). In automated server
verification pipelines with UI:N, impact scales up to CVSS 8.6 High. |
| Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in the traversal engine in rrrene html_sanitize_ex allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server CPU and memory via a flat run of sibling elements in sanitized HTML. The list clause of HtmlSanitizeEx.Traverser.traverse/2 recurses on the tail of a sibling list and then evaluates List.flatten([head] ++ tail) over the already flattened result, so every one of n siblings copies and re-walks the entire remaining tail. The flattening is only needed for the rare case where scrub returns several replacement nodes for one node, but the cost is paid across the whole tail at every step, making traversal quadratic in sibling count.
The traverser sits on every public entry point, so no particular scrubber or configuration is required and the payload needs only allowed tags. A 160 KB body of 20,000 sibling elements occupies a scheduler for roughly 1.7 seconds, and the cost grows faster than the body does.
This issue affects html_sanitize_ex: from 0.3.1 before 1.4.5 and from 1.5.0-rc.0 before 1.5.3. |
| Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in ash-project ash_paper_trail allows a user who can submit a large array attribute to a paper-trailed create or update action to cause a denial of service through excessive CPU and memory use.
With full-diff change tracking, AshPaperTrail.ChangeBuilders.FullDiff.ListChange pairs each prior array element against the new list by rebuilding the remaining-elements accumulator with acc ++ [tuple] on every step, copying the growing list each time, so the pairing scales cubically in the array length. Nothing bounds the length and the value comes straight from action input, so one request carrying a large accepted {:array, _} attribute forces tens of seconds of CPU and multi-gigabyte allocations.
This issue affects ash_paper_trail: from 0.1.1 before 0.7.0. |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to force an expensive regular expression to run on input that a length constraint should have already rejected.
Ash.Type.String.apply_constraints/2 (lib/ash/type/string.ex) evaluated the :match regex regardless of the min_length and max_length constraints on the same attribute. Because the length check did not gate the regex, an over-length value that the length constraint rejects still had the pattern applied to it, so the length limit that would otherwise bound the work never constrained the regex input. Against a backtracking pattern this yields catastrophic regex evaluation on attacker-sized input, and even a linear pattern runs on arbitrarily large input, consuming CPU per request. The fix skips the :match regex whenever a length constraint is violated, making the two checks order-independent.
This issue affects ash: from 0.10.0 before 3.32.2. |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in ash-project ash lets an attacker exhaust node memory by matching a filter that spans multiple to-many relationships in memory.
Ash.Filter.Runtime matches a filter against an in-memory record by first expanding the record into combinations of its related rows. flatten_relationships/2 (lib/ash/filter/runtime.ex) eagerly built the full Cartesian product across the filter's to-many relationship paths, so a record with K to-many relationships of M rows each materialized on the order of M^K scenarios before any predicate was checked. A filter or dataset that reaches several sizeable to-many relationships therefore allocates memory combinatorially and can exhaust the node. The fix streams the expansion lazily and short-circuits on the first matching scenario, bounding the work.
This issue affects ash: from 1.29.0-rc0 before 3.32.2. |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in ash-project ash lets a slow asynchronous read spin a scheduler thread at full CPU while the framework waits for it.
Ash.Actions.Read.AsyncLimiter.await_at_least_one/1 (lib/ash/actions/read/async_limiter.ex) waited for concurrent async read tasks by polling each with Task.yield(task, 0) in a tight loop rather than blocking. While every outstanding task is still running (a slow related-data load or calculation), the loop returns immediately and repeats, busy-spinning and holding a BEAM scheduler at full CPU for the whole duration of the slow read; concurrent slow reads tie up further schedulers. The fix waits with Task.yield_many (a non-blocking sweep followed by a blocking wait with timeout: :infinity), so the process sleeps until a task completes instead of spinning.
This issue affects ash: from 2.19.0 before 3.32.2. |
| Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a remote HTTP server to exhaust CPU on the client host and cause a denial of service.
parse_hex_prefix/2 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex folds each hex digit of a chunked response's chunk-size field into an arbitrary-precision accumulator with acc * 16 + digit and imposes no limit on the digit count. Because the accumulator grows without bound, the multiplication is not constant time and one pass over N digits costs O(N squared). handle_data/2 prepends conn.buffer and re-parses from the start on every socket message, so a server that dribbles the digits out in small packets makes the client pay that cost repeatedly. A run of roughly 512,000 hex digits costs over ten seconds of CPU in a single pass, measured on stock defaults. The parser reaches this state after a valid status line and a complete, valid header section, so an intermediary inspecting only headers sees an ordinary 200 response.
This issue affects mint: from 1.9.3 before 1.10.0. |
| Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc_server and grpc allows unauthenticated attackers to occupy a BEAM scheduler indefinitely via a client-streaming or bidirectional-streaming request whose body ends inside a gRPC message.
GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy.read_stream/1 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy.ex, and the Cowboy adapter in grpc before the package split) asks for more data whenever the buffer does not hold a complete message. Once the request body has ended, every further read returns an empty chunk, so the buffer never changes and the function retries without end. A single 5-byte length prefix sent with END_STREAM keeps one scheduler busy for as long as the connection stays open, and repeated requests exhaust all schedulers.
This issue affects grpc: from 0.3.1 before 1.0.0; grpc_server: from 1.0.0 before 1.1.0. |
| Incus before 7.6.0 contains a resource exhaustion vulnerability in the storage bucket S3 listener, which buffers entire signed request bodies in memory before verifying the signature or credential role. Attackers knowing only a valid access key, or holding a read-only credential, can send many concurrent large requests to exhaust daemon memory. |
| A caller with write permission in a namespace can terminate temporal-proxy through memory exhaustion by storing highly compressed payloads in Workflow history, and the stored history causes the same failure on every later read. temporal-proxy 1.2.0 decompresses every payload marked as compressed in the responses it forwards, whether or not compression is configured. Each payload is limited to 4 MiB after decompression, but the total for a response is not, and the decoded payloads are held in memory together. The caller can store many small, highly compressed payloads through the proxy or directly at the upstream Temporal service. When that history is read through the proxy, for example by a Worker processing a task, the proxy can run out of memory and be terminated. The codec server's /decode endpoint is affected in the same way when it is enabled. Only temporal-proxy 1.2.0 is affected; earlier versions do not decompress payloads. The issue is fixed in 1.2.1. Upgrade to 1.2.1 or later. |
| FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, after FreeSWITCH has learned and closed source learning for an RTP peer, read_rtp_packet() and rtp_common_read() in src/switch_rtp.c reject RTP from an unrecognized source only after packet classification and, for encrypted calls, SRTP processing. An unauthenticated attacker with UDP reachability to an active RTP or SRTP media port can sustain a foreign-source packet flood that occupies the media read path and prevents legitimate media from entering FreeSWITCH on calls that consume incoming media for relay or echo. The resulting one-way audio allows the affected endpoint to continue hearing the other party, but the other party loses that endpoint's audio, leaving SIP signaling established while the call is unusable for conversation. Transmit-only playback was unaffected in testing. A caller can learn the media port from the SDP answer, while a third party must first discover an active port, and no valid SRTP key is required. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.2. |
| libp2p is a JavaScript implementation of the libp2p networking stack. Prior to 5.1.22, the @libp2p/crypto code reached by the default Identify service accepts a remote peer’s crafted publicKey before peer-id or signature verification and passes it through publicKeyFromProtobuf to the ASN.1 DER decoder. readLength in packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts accepts long-form element lengths larger than the remaining buffer, causing readInteger and related readers to loop synchronously over an attacker-claimed length from a very small key blob. Because decoding occurs in one event-loop tick before the remotePeer equality check in packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts, the Identify timeout cannot interrupt it, allowing repeated unauthenticated connections to stall all timers and peers and transiently exhaust memory. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.22. |
| Vulnerability in the Helidon product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: helidon-webserver-static-content). Supported versions that are affected are 3.0.0-3.2.22, 4.0.0-4.5.6 and 27.0.0-27.0.1. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Helidon. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a partial denial of service (partial DOS) of Helidon. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 3.7 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L). |
| JSON::XS versions before 4.05 for Perl leak the decoded key of an object rejected for a missing colon in decode_hv.
Unless it is short plain ASCII, a quoted key is decoded into a new scalar. Nothing frees that scalar when the object is rejected for a missing ':' after the key.
A process that keeps running after a failed decode retains one key per rejected document, with its size chosen by the sender. Repeated requests exhaust process memory. |
| JSON::XS versions before 4.05 for Perl leak the decoded part of a rejected long string in decode_str.
A string is decoded through a fixed-size buffer (16 KiB in 4.04), and each time the buffer fills its contents move into a new scalar. Nothing frees that scalar when the string is then rejected for a control character, an invalid escape, malformed UTF-8 or the end of the input.
A process that keeps running after a failed decode retains the decoded part of each rejected string, with its size chosen by the sender. Repeated requests exhaust process memory. |
| @fastify/busboy is a streaming parser for multipart form data used by Fastify. In versions 1.0.0 through 3.2.5, a multipart part whose header block is never terminated before the next boundary is counted by the vendored Dicer parser as an open part that never ends, so the parser emits neither a finish nor an error event and the request hangs. A single unauthenticated request of roughly one hundred bytes triggers the stall, and through @fastify/multipart the hung handler is not released when the client disconnects, so repeated requests leak handlers and whatever resources they hold, such as files, database connections and concurrency slots, until the process is restarted. The same parser is reached by the formData methods of undici versions 5.25.3 through 6.7.0. The issue is fixed in @fastify/busboy 3.2.6, and users should upgrade to 3.2.6 or later. As a workaround, configure Fastify's handler timeout so hung handlers are eventually terminated and their resources released. |
| @fastify/busboy is a streaming parser for multipart and url-encoded form data used by Fastify. In versions 1.0.0 through 3.2.5, the url-encoded parser stops accumulating a field only when the decoded length exactly equals the configured per-field size limit, and a malformed percent escape is passed through verbatim by the decoder, so the decoded length can jump from just below the limit to just above it and skip that equality check. The parser then keeps buffering the field in memory until the next delimiter or the end of the request, so a single unauthenticated url-encoded field or field name can grow to the size of the whole request body regardless of a much smaller configured per-field limit, with memory use bounded only by the independent whole-request body limit. The issue is fixed in @fastify/busboy 3.2.6, which clamps a field as soon as the decoded length reaches or exceeds the limit, and users should upgrade to 3.2.6 or later. As a workaround, set a conservative whole-request body limit so the per-field overshoot cannot exceed it. |