| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix zeropoint update where i_size > remote_i_size
Fix the update of the zero point[*] by netfs_release_folio() when there is
uncommitted data in the pagecache beyond the folio being released but the
on-server EOF is in this folio (ie. i_size > remote_i_size). The update
needs to limit zero_point to remote_i_size, not i_size as i_size is a local
phenomenon reflecting updates made locally to the pagecache, not stuff
written to the server. remote_i_size tracks the server's i_size.
[*] The zero point is the file position from which we can assume that the
server will just return zeros, so we can avoid generating reads.
Note that netfs_invalidate_folio() probably doesn't need fixing as
zero_point should be updated by setattr after truncation or fallocate.
Found with:
fsx -q -N 1000000 -p 10000 -o 128000 -l 600000 \
/xfstest.test/junk --replay-ops=junk.fsxops
using the following as junk.fsxops:
truncate 0x0 0x1bbae 0x82864
write 0x3ef2e 0xf9c8 0x1bbae
write 0x67e05 0xcb5a 0x4e8f6
mapread 0x57781 0x85b6 0x7495f
copy_range 0x5d3d 0x10329 0x54fac 0x7495f
write 0x64710 0x1c2b 0x7495f
mapread 0x64000 0x1000 0x7495f
on cifs with the default cache option.
It shows read-gaps on folio 0x64 failing with a short read (ie. it hits
EOF) if the FMODE_READ check is commented out in netfs_perform_write():
if (//(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) ||
netfs_is_cache_enabled(ctx)) {
and no fscache. This was initially found with the generic/522 xfstest. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/adreno: Fix a reference leak in a6xx_gpu_init()
In a6xx_gpu_init(), node is obtained via of_parse_phandle().
While there was a manual of_node_put() at the end of the
common path, several early error returns would bypass this call,
resulting in a reference leak.
Fix this by using the __free(device_node) cleanup handler to
release the reference when the variable goes out of scope.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/700661/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: capture fast-RX rate before mesh reuses skb->cb
ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() reads RX status through
IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb), which aliases the same skb->cb storage
that ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() reuses as IEEE80211_TX_INFO. In the
unicast forward path, mesh_data does:
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(fwd_skb);
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
on the same skb the caller still names via rx->skb, then either
queues the skb for TX (success) or kfree_skb()'s it (no-route)
before returning RX_QUEUED. The caller's RX_QUEUED arm then
calls sta_stats_encode_rate(status) on memory that is either
zeroed (success path) or freed (no-route path). The latter is
KASAN slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle.
Fix by encoding the rate from status before invoking
ieee80211_rx_mesh_data(), so the RX_QUEUED arm consumes a value
captured while status was still backed by valid memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: x_tables: allocate hook ops while under mutex
arp/ip(6)t_register_table() add the table to the per-netns list via
xt_register_table() before allocating the per-netns hook ops copy
via kmemdup_array(). This leaves a window where the table is
visible in the list with ops=NULL.
If the pernet exit happens runs concurrently the pre_exit callback finds
the table via xt_find_table() and passes the NULL ops pointer to
nf_unregister_net_hooks(), causing a NULL dereference:
general protection fault in nf_unregister_net_hooks+0xbc/0x150
RIP: nf_unregister_net_hooks (net/netfilter/core.c:613)
Call Trace:
ipt_unregister_table_pre_exit
iptable_mangle_net_pre_exit
ops_pre_exit_list
cleanup_net
Fix by moving the ops allocation into the xtables core so the table is
never in the list without valid ops. Also ensure the table is no longer
processing packets before its torn down on error unwind.
nf_register_net_hooks might have published at least one hook; call
synchronize_rcu() if there was an error.
audit log register message gets deferred until all operations have
passed, this avoids need to emit another ureg message in case of
error unwinding.
Based on earlier patch by Tristan Madani. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix missing locking around retry adding new subreqs
Fix netfs_retry_read_subrequests() and netfs_retry_write_stream() to take
the appropriate lock when adding extra subrequests into
stream->subrequests. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix leak of request in netfs_write_begin() error handling
Fix netfs_write_begin() to not leak our ref on the request in the event
that we get an error from netfs_wait_for_read(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: fix stale per-CPU tcp_tw_isn leak enabling ISN prediction
Blamed commit moved the TIME_WAIT-derived ISN from the skb control
block to a per-CPU variable, assuming the value would always be consumed
by tcp_conn_request() for the same packet that wrote it. That assumption
is violated by multiple drop paths between the producer
(__this_cpu_write(tcp_tw_isn, isn) in tcp_v{4,6}_rcv()) and the consumer
(tcp_conn_request()):
- min_ttl / min_hopcount check
- xfrm policy check
- tcp_inbound_hash() MD5/AO mismatch
- tcp_filter() eBPF/SO_ATTACH_FILTER drop
- th->syn && th->fin discard in tcp_rcv_state_process() TCP_LISTEN
- psp_sk_rx_policy_check() in tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv()
- tcp_checksum_complete() in tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv()
- tcp_v{4,6}_cookie_check() returning NULL
When a packet is dropped on any of these paths, tcp_tw_isn is left set.
The next SYN processed on the same CPU then consumes the non zero value in
tcp_conn_request(), receiving a potentially predictable ISN.
This patch moves back tcp_tw_isn to skb->cb[], getting rid of the per-cpu
variable.
Note that tcp_v{4,6}_fill_cb() do not set it.
Very litle impact on overall code size/complexity:
$ scripts/bloat-o-meter -t vmlinux.old vmlinux.new
add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 2/1 up/down: 8/-15 (-7)
Function old new delta
tcp_v6_rcv 3038 3042 +4
tcp_v4_rcv 3035 3039 +4
tcp_conn_request 2938 2923 -15
Total: Before=24436060, After=24436053, chg -0.00% |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix setup list UAF on proc write error
snd_pcm_oss_proc_write() links a newly allocated setup entry into the
OSS setup list before duplicating the task name. If the task-name
allocation fails, the error path frees the already linked entry and
leaves setup_list pointing at freed memory.
A later OSS device open can then walk the stale list entry in
snd_pcm_oss_look_for_setup() and dereference freed memory.
Allocate the task name and initialize the setup entry before publishing
the entry on setup_list. Also fetch the initial proc read iterator only
after taking setup_mutex, so all setup_list traversal follows the same
list lifetime rules. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: rss: fix indir_table and hkey leak on get_rxfh failure
rss_prepare_get() allocates the indirection table and hash key buffer
via rss_get_data_alloc(), then calls ops->get_rxfh() to populate them.
If get_rxfh() fails, the function returns an error without freeing
the allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: module: call ethnl_ops_complete() on module flash errors
When validate() fails we are skipping over ethnl_ops_complete()
even tho we already called ethnl_ops_begin(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit
handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net
pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit()
reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in
FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a
consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put()
(svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases
sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing
sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code
either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory.
The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt
protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are
independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer
owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected.
Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was
pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file.
Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels
between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching
FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in
handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side
takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference
inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side
operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel()
can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference,
either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by
dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit
get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore
redundant and goes away.
Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the
FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count
assertions stay balanced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: airoha: Do not read uninitialized fragment address in airoha_dev_xmit()
The transmit loop in airoha_dev_xmit() reads fragment address and length
during its final iteration, when the loop index equals
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags, at which point the fragment data is
uninitialized. While these values are never consumed, the read itself is
unsafe and may trigger a page fault. Fix this by avoiding the fragment
read on the last iteration.
Additionally, move the skb pointer from the first to the last used packet
descriptor, so that airoha_qdma_tx_napi_poll() defers freeing the skb
until the final descriptor is processed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write
When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the
previously written data back from the COW inode:
prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets
use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode:
f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)->cow_inode : inode,
...);
and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption
(STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via
fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto().
However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode
(folio->mapping->host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was
encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode's context, not
the COW inode's -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off
fio->page->mapping->host. fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise
operates on folio->mapping->host.
The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits
its encryption policy from there. With test_dummy_encryption the newly
created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a
pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g.
already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted. The read
path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls
fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted
original inode) has a NULL ->i_crypt_info, dereferencing it:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
RIP: 0010:fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks+0xa0/0x310
Workqueue: f2fs_post_read_wq f2fs_post_read_work
Call Trace:
fscrypt_decrypt_bio+0x1eb/0x340
f2fs_post_read_work+0xba/0x140
process_one_work+0x91c/0x1a40
worker_thread+0x677/0xe90
kthread+0x2bc/0x3a0
The COW inode is only needed to locate the on-disk block, and that block
address is already resolved into @blkaddr by prepare_atomic_write_begin()
via __find_data_block(cow_inode, ...); f2fs_submit_page_read() then reads
from that physical @blkaddr directly, so the inode argument only selects
the post-read crypto context, not which block is fetched. Reading with
@inode therefore returns the same (latest, not-yet-committed) COW data,
while making both the fs-layer decryption decision and the inline crypto
path use the correct (original inode's) key.
With the COW inode no longer used at the read site, the use_cow flag has no
remaining consumer; drop it from f2fs_write_begin() and
prepare_atomic_write_begin(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/napi: cap busy_poll_to 10 msec
Currently there's no cap on the maximum amount of time that napi is
allowed to poll if no events are found, which can lead to kernel
complaints on a task being stuck as there's no conditional rescheduling
done within that loop.
Just cap it to 10 msec in total, that's already way above any kind of
sane value that will reap any benefits, yet low enough that it's
nowhere near being able to trigger preemption complaints. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Wrap DCN32 phantom-plane allocation in DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED
[Why]
dcn32_validate_bandwidth() wraps dcn32_internal_validate_bw() with
DC_FP_START()/DC_FP_END(). In x86 non-RT, DC_FP_START takes fpregs_lock(),
which disables local softirqs.
The DML1 path through dcn32_enable_phantom_plane() calls kvzalloc() to
allocate ~335 KiB for dc_plane_state. This triggers the vmalloc path,
which calls BUG_ON(in_interrupt()) because it's invoked within the
FPU-enabled (softirq disabled) region, leading to a kernel crash.
[How]
Wrap the dc_state_create_phantom_plane() call with the
DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED() macro to allow preemption during
this memory allocation.
(cherry picked from commit 885ccbef7b94a8b38f69c4211c679021aa27ad11) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Take the SRCU lock for page table walks in fault injection and AT emulation
walk_s1() and kvm_walk_nested_s2() expect to be called while holding
kvm->srcu to guard against memslot changes. While this is generally
the case, __kvm_at_s12() and __kvm_find_s1_desc_level() call into the
respective walkers without taking kvm->srcu.
Fix by acquiring kvm->srcu prior to the table walk in both instances. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: rockchip: fix generic IRQ chip leak on remove
The driver allocates domain generic chips using
irq_alloc_domain_generic_chips() during probe. However, on driver
remove/teardown, the generic chips are not automatically freed when the
IRQ domain is removed because the domain flags do not include
IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC.
This causes both the domain generic chips structure and the associated
generic chips to be leaked. Additionally, the generic chips remain on
the global gc_list and may later be visited by generic IRQ chip suspend,
resume, or shutdown callbacks after the GPIO bank has been removed,
potentially resulting in a use-after-free and kernel crash.
Fix the resource leak by explicitly calling
irq_domain_remove_generic_chips() before removing the IRQ domain in
rockchip_gpio_remove(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix buffer over-read in rtw_update_protection
rtw_update_protection() is called with a pointer offset into the
ies buffer but the full ie_length is passed, causing a potential
buffer over-read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: rtw_mlme: add bounds checks before ie_length subtraction
Add guards to ensure ie_length is large enough before subtracting
fixed IE offsets to prevent unsigned integer underflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmem: core: fix use-after-free bugs in error paths
Fix several instances of error paths in which we call
__nvmem_device_put() - which may end up freeing the underlying memory
and other resources - and then keep on using the nvmem structure. Always
put the reference to the nvmem device as the last step before returning
the error code. |
