| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: microchip-core-qspi: stop checking viability of op->max_freq in supports_op callback
In commit 13529647743d9 ("spi: microchip-core-qspi: Support per spi-mem
operation frequency switches") the logic for checking the viability of
op->max_freq in mchp_coreqspi_setup_clock() was copied into
mchp_coreqspi_supports_op(). Unfortunately, op->max_freq is not valid
when this function is called during probe but is instead zero.
Accordingly, baud_rate_val is calculated to be INT_MAX due to division
by zero, causing probe of the attached memory device to fail.
Seemingly spi-microchip-core-qspi was the only driver that had such a
modification made to its supports_op callback when the per_op_freq
capability was added, so just remove it to restore prior functionality. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: always call ceph_shift_unused_folios_left()
The function ceph_process_folio_batch() sets folio_batch entries to
NULL, which is an illegal state. Before folio_batch_release() crashes
due to this API violation, the function ceph_shift_unused_folios_left()
is supposed to remove those NULLs from the array.
However, since commit ce80b76dd327 ("ceph: introduce
ceph_process_folio_batch() method"), this shifting doesn't happen
anymore because the "for" loop got moved to ceph_process_folio_batch(),
and now the `i` variable that remains in ceph_writepages_start()
doesn't get incremented anymore, making the shifting effectively
unreachable much of the time.
Later, commit 1551ec61dc55 ("ceph: introduce ceph_submit_write()
method") added more preconditions for doing the shift, replacing the
`i` check (with something that is still just as broken):
- if ceph_process_folio_batch() fails, shifting never happens
- if ceph_move_dirty_page_in_page_array() was never called (because
ceph_process_folio_batch() has returned early for some of various
reasons), shifting never happens
- if `processed_in_fbatch` is zero (because ceph_process_folio_batch()
has returned early for some of the reasons mentioned above or
because ceph_move_dirty_page_in_page_array() has failed), shifting
never happens
Since those two commits, any problem in ceph_process_folio_batch()
could crash the kernel, e.g. this way:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000034
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 172 UID: 0 PID: 2342707 Comm: kworker/u778:8 Not tainted 6.15.10-cm4all1-es #714 NONE
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7615/0G9DHV, BIOS 1.6.10 12/08/2023
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-ceph-1)
RIP: 0010:folios_put_refs+0x85/0x140
Code: 83 c5 01 39 e8 7e 76 48 63 c5 49 8b 5c c4 08 b8 01 00 00 00 4d 85 ed 74 05 41 8b 44 ad 00 48 8b 15 b0 >
RSP: 0018:ffffb880af8db778 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000003
RDX: ffffe377cc3b0000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb880af8db8c0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000007d R09: 000000000102b86f
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000000ac R12: ffffb880af8db8c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9bd262c97000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9c8efc303000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000034 CR3: 0000000160958004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ceph_writepages_start+0xeb9/0x1410
The crash can be reproduced easily by changing the
ceph_check_page_before_write() return value to `-E2BIG`.
(Interestingly, the crash happens only if `huge_zero_folio` has
already been allocated; without `huge_zero_folio`,
is_huge_zero_folio(NULL) returns true and folios_put_refs() skips NULL
entries instead of dereferencing them. That makes reproducing the bug
somewhat unreliable. See
https://lore.kernel.org/20250826231626.218675-1-max.kellermann@ionos.com
for a discussion of this detail.)
My suggestion is to move the ceph_shift_unused_folios_left() to right
after ceph_process_folio_batch() to ensure it always gets called to
fix up the illegal folio_batch state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix crash after fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks() error
The function move_dirty_folio_in_page_array() was created by commit
ce80b76dd327 ("ceph: introduce ceph_process_folio_batch() method") by
moving code from ceph_writepages_start() to this function.
This new function is supposed to return an error code which is checked
by the caller (now ceph_process_folio_batch()), and on error, the
caller invokes redirty_page_for_writepage() and then breaks from the
loop.
However, the refactoring commit has gone wrong, and it by accident, it
always returns 0 (= success) because it first NULLs the pointer and
then returns PTR_ERR(NULL) which is always 0. This means errors are
silently ignored, leaving NULL entries in the page array, which may
later crash the kernel.
The simple solution is to call PTR_ERR() before clearing the pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7915: fix list corruption after hardware restart
Since stations are recreated from scratch, all lists that wcids are added
to must be cleared before calling ieee80211_restart_hw.
Set wcid->sta = 0 for each wcid entry in order to ensure that they are
not added again before they are ready. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: HWS, Fix memory leak in hws_action_get_shared_stc_nic error flow
When an invalid stc_type is provided, the function allocates memory for
shared_stc but jumps to unlock_and_out without freeing it, causing a
memory leak.
Fix by jumping to free_shared_stc label instead to ensure proper cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: HWS, Fix memory leak in hws_pool_buddy_init error path
In the error path of hws_pool_buddy_init(), the buddy allocator cleanup
doesn't free the allocator structure itself, causing a memory leak.
Add the missing kfree() to properly release all allocated memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: x86/aegis - Add missing error checks
The skcipher_walk functions can allocate memory and can fail, so
checking for errors is necessary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mremap: fix WARN with uffd that has remap events disabled
Registering userfaultd on a VMA that spans at least one PMD and then
mremap()'ing that VMA can trigger a WARN when recovering from a failed
page table move due to a page table allocation error.
The code ends up doing the right thing (recurse, avoiding moving actual
page tables), but triggering that WARN is unpleasant:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 6133 at mm/mremap.c:357 move_normal_pmd mm/mremap.c:357 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 6133 at mm/mremap.c:357 move_pgt_entry mm/mremap.c:595 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 6133 at mm/mremap.c:357 move_page_tables+0x3832/0x44a0 mm/mremap.c:852
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6133 Comm: syz.0.19 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00004-g53e760d89498 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:move_normal_pmd mm/mremap.c:357 [inline]
RIP: 0010:move_pgt_entry mm/mremap.c:595 [inline]
RIP: 0010:move_page_tables+0x3832/0x44a0 mm/mremap.c:852
Code: ...
RSP: 0018:ffffc900037a76d8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000032930007 RCX: ffffffff820c6645
RDX: ffff88802e56a440 RSI: ffffffff820c7201 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: ffff888037728fc0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000032930007 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc900037a79a8 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 000055556316a500(0000) GS:ffff8880d68bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b30863fff CR3: 0000000050171000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
copy_vma_and_data+0x468/0x790 mm/mremap.c:1215
move_vma+0x548/0x1780 mm/mremap.c:1282
mremap_to+0x1b7/0x450 mm/mremap.c:1406
do_mremap+0xfad/0x1f80 mm/mremap.c:1921
__do_sys_mremap+0x119/0x170 mm/mremap.c:1977
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f00d0b8ebe9
Code: ...
RSP: 002b:00007ffe5ea5ee98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000019
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f00d0db5fa0 RCX: 00007f00d0b8ebe9
RDX: 0000000000400000 RSI: 0000000000c00000 RDI: 0000200000000000
RBP: 00007ffe5ea5eef0 R08: 0000200000c00000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: 00007f00d0db5fa0 R14: 00007f00d0db5fa0 R15: 0000000000000005
</TASK>
The underlying issue is that we recurse during the original page table
move, but not during the recovery move.
Fix it by checking for both VMAs and performing the check before the
pmd_none() sanity check.
Add a new helper where we perform+document that check for the PMD and PUD
level.
Thanks to Harry for bisecting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix sleeping-in-atomic in ath11k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask()
ath11k_mac_disable_peer_fixed_rate() is passed as the iterator to
ieee80211_iterate_stations_atomic(). Note in this case the iterator is
required to be atomic, however ath11k_mac_disable_peer_fixed_rate() does
not follow it as it might sleep. Consequently below warning is seen:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at wmi.c:304
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl
__might_resched.cold
ath11k_wmi_cmd_send
ath11k_wmi_set_peer_param
ath11k_mac_disable_peer_fixed_rate
ieee80211_iterate_stations_atomic
ath11k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask.cold
Change to ieee80211_iterate_stations_mtx() to fix this issue.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: Fix error code in iwl_op_mode_dvm_start()
Preserve the error code if iwl_setup_deferred_work() fails. The current
code returns ERR_PTR(0) (which is NULL) on this path. I believe the
missing error code potentially leads to a use after free involving
debugfs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Pass ab pointer directly to ath12k_dp_tx_get_encap_type()
In ath12k_dp_tx_get_encap_type(), the arvif parameter is only used to
retrieve the ab pointer. In vdev delete sequence the arvif->ar could
become NULL and that would trigger kernel panic.
Since the caller ath12k_dp_tx() already has a valid ab pointer, pass it
directly to avoid panic and unnecessary dereferencing.
PC points to "ath12k_dp_tx+0x228/0x988 [ath12k]"
LR points to "ath12k_dp_tx+0xc8/0x988 [ath12k]".
The Backtrace obtained is as follows:
ath12k_dp_tx+0x228/0x988 [ath12k]
ath12k_mac_tx_check_max_limit+0x608/0x920 [ath12k]
ieee80211_process_measurement_req+0x320/0x348 [mac80211]
ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x9ac/0x1518 [mac80211]
ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0xb14/0x1518 [mac80211]
ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb+0x224/0x254 [mac80211]
ieee80211_xmit+0xec/0x100 [mac80211]
__ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc50/0xf40 [mac80211]
ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x2e8/0x308 [mac80211]
netdev_start_xmit+0x150/0x18c
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x74/0xc0
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.3.1-00173-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86/amd: pmf: Use device managed allocations
If setting up smart PC fails for any reason then this can lead to
a double free when unloading amd-pmf. This is because dev->buf was
freed but never set to NULL and is again freed in amd_pmf_remove().
To avoid subtle allocation bugs in failures leading to a double free
change all allocations into device managed allocations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix GCC_GCC_PCIE_HOT_RST definition for WCN7850
GCC_GCC_PCIE_HOT_RST is wrongly defined for WCN7850, causing kernel crash
on some specific platforms.
Since this register is divergent for WCN7850 and QCN9274, move it to
register table to allow different definitions. Then correct the register
address for WCN7850 to fix this issue.
Note IPQ5332 is not affected as it is not PCIe based device.
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.0.c5-00481-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix invalid access to memory
In ath12k_dp_rx_msdu_coalesce(), rxcb is fetched from skb and boolean
is_continuation is part of rxcb.
Currently, after freeing the skb, the rxcb->is_continuation accessed
again which is wrong since the memory is already freed.
This might lead use-after-free error.
Hence, fix by locally defining bool is_continuation from rxcb,
so that after freeing skb, is_continuation can be used.
Compile tested only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: pci: configure manual DAC mode via PCI config API only
To support 36-bit DMA, configure chip proprietary bit via PCI config API
or chip DBI interface. However, the PCI device mmap isn't set yet and
the DBI is also inaccessible via mmap, so only if the bit can be accessible
via PCI config API, chip can support 36-bit DMA. Otherwise, fallback to
32-bit DMA.
With NULL mmap address, kernel throws trace:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001090
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 71 Comm: irq/26-pciehp Tainted: G OE 6.14.2-061402-generic #202504101348
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
RIP: 0010:rtw89_pci_ops_write16+0x12/0x30 [rtw89_pci]
RSP: 0018:ffffb0ffc0acf9d8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffffffffc158f9c0 RBX: ffff94865e702020 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000718 RSI: 0000000000001090 RDI: ffff94865e702020
RBP: ffffb0ffc0acf9d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000015
R13: 0000000000000719 R14: ffffb0ffc0acfa1f R15: ffffffffc1813060
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9486f3480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000001090 CR3: 0000000090440001 CR4: 00000000000626f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rtw89_pci_read_config_byte+0x6d/0x120 [rtw89_pci]
rtw89_pci_cfg_dac+0x5b/0xb0 [rtw89_pci]
rtw89_pci_probe+0xa96/0xbd0 [rtw89_pci]
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
local_pci_probe+0x47/0xa0
pci_call_probe+0x5d/0x190
pci_device_probe+0xa7/0x160
really_probe+0xf9/0x370
? pm_runtime_barrier+0x55/0xa0
__driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x140
driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0
__device_attach_driver+0xcd/0x170
bus_for_each_drv+0x99/0x100
__device_attach+0xb4/0x1d0
device_attach+0x10/0x20
pci_bus_add_device+0x59/0x90
pci_bus_add_devices+0x31/0x80
pciehp_configure_device+0xaa/0x170
pciehp_enable_slot+0xd6/0x240
pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xf1/0x180
pciehp_ist+0x162/0x1c0
irq_thread_fn+0x24/0x70
irq_thread+0xef/0x1c0
? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xfc/0x230
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Do not include stack ptr register in precision backtracking bookkeeping
Yi Lai reported an issue ([1]) where the following warning appears
in kernel dmesg:
[ 60.643604] verifier backtracking bug
[ 60.643635] WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 2315 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:4302 __mark_chain_precision+0x3a6c/0x3e10
[ 60.648428] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE)
[ 60.650471] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 2315 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.15.0-rc4-gef11287f8289-dirty #327 PREEMPT(full)
[ 60.654385] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[ 60.656682] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 60.660475] RIP: 0010:__mark_chain_precision+0x3a6c/0x3e10
[ 60.662814] Code: 5a 30 84 89 ea e8 c4 d9 01 00 80 3d 3e 7d d8 04 00 0f 85 60 fa ff ff c6 05 31 7d d8 04
01 48 c7 c7 00 58 30 84 e8 c4 06 a5 ff <0f> 0b e9 46 fa ff ff 48 ...
[ 60.668720] RSP: 0018:ffff888116cc7298 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 60.671075] RAX: 54d70e82dfd31900 RBX: ffff888115b65e20 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 60.673659] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 60.676241] RBP: 0000000000000400 R08: ffff8881f6f23bd3 R09: 1ffff1103ede477a
[ 60.678787] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed103ede477b R12: ffff888115b60ae8
[ 60.681420] R13: 1ffff11022b6cbc4 R14: 00000000fffffff2 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 60.684030] FS: 00007fc2aedd80c0(0000) GS:ffff88826fa8a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 60.686837] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 60.689027] CR2: 000056325369e000 CR3: 000000011088b002 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[ 60.691623] Call Trace:
[ 60.692821] <TASK>
[ 60.693960] ? __pfx_verbose+0x10/0x10
[ 60.695656] ? __pfx_disasm_kfunc_name+0x10/0x10
[ 60.697495] check_cond_jmp_op+0x16f7/0x39b0
[ 60.699237] do_check+0x58fa/0xab10
...
Further analysis shows the warning is at line 4302 as below:
4294 /* static subprog call instruction, which
4295 * means that we are exiting current subprog,
4296 * so only r1-r5 could be still requested as
4297 * precise, r0 and r6-r10 or any stack slot in
4298 * the current frame should be zero by now
4299 */
4300 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) {
4301 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt));
4302 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
4303 return -EFAULT;
4304 }
With the below test (also in the next patch):
__used __naked static void __bpf_jmp_r10(void)
{
asm volatile (
"r2 = 2314885393468386424 ll;"
"goto +0;"
"if r2 <= r10 goto +3;"
"if r1 >= -1835016 goto +0;"
"if r2 <= 8 goto +0;"
"if r3 <= 0 goto +0;"
"exit;"
::: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("?raw_tp")
__naked void bpf_jmp_r10(void)
{
asm volatile (
"r3 = 0 ll;"
"call __bpf_jmp_r10;"
"r0 = 0;"
"exit;"
::: __clobber_all);
}
The following is the verifier failure log:
0: (18) r3 = 0x0 ; R3_w=0
2: (85) call pc+2
caller:
R10=fp0
callee:
frame1: R1=ctx() R3_w=0 R10=fp0
5: frame1: R1=ctx() R3_w=0 R10=fp0
; asm volatile (" \ @ verifier_precision.c:184
5: (18) r2 = 0x20202000256c6c78 ; frame1: R2_w=0x20202000256c6c78
7: (05) goto pc+0
8: (bd) if r2 <= r10 goto pc+3 ; frame1: R2_w=0x20202000256c6c78 R10=fp0
9: (35) if r1 >= 0xffe3fff8 goto pc+0 ; frame1: R1=ctx()
10: (b5) if r2 <= 0x8 goto pc+0
mark_precise: frame1: last_idx 10 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2 stack= before 9: (35) if r1 >= 0xffe3fff8 goto pc+0
mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2 stack= before 8: (bd) if r2 <= r10 goto pc+3
mark_preci
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: sanitize request list handling
Validate the request in nvme_tcp_handle_r2t() to ensure it's not part of
any list, otherwise a malicious R2T PDU might inject a loop in request
list processing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: fix uprobe pte be overwritten when expanding vma
Patch series "Fix uprobe pte be overwritten when expanding vma".
This patch (of 4):
We encountered a BUG alert triggered by Syzkaller as follows:
BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000b4a60fca type:MM_ANONPAGES val:1
And we can reproduce it with the following steps:
1. register uprobe on file at zero offset
2. mmap the file at zero offset:
addr1 = mmap(NULL, 2 * 4096, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
3. mremap part of vma1 to new vma2:
addr2 = mremap(addr1, 4096, 2 * 4096, MREMAP_MAYMOVE);
4. mremap back to orig addr1:
mremap(addr2, 4096, 4096, MREMAP_MAYMOVE | MREMAP_FIXED, addr1);
In step 3, the vma1 range [addr1, addr1 + 4096] will be remap to new vma2
with range [addr2, addr2 + 8192], and remap uprobe anon page from the vma1
to vma2, then unmap the vma1 range [addr1, addr1 + 4096].
In step 4, the vma2 range [addr2, addr2 + 4096] will be remap back to the
addr range [addr1, addr1 + 4096]. Since the addr range [addr1 + 4096,
addr1 + 8192] still maps the file, it will take vma_merge_new_range to
expand the range, and then do uprobe_mmap in vma_complete. Since the
merged vma pgoff is also zero offset, it will install uprobe anon page to
the merged vma. However, the upcomming move_page_tables step, which use
set_pte_at to remap the vma2 uprobe pte to the merged vma, will overwrite
the newly uprobe pte in the merged vma, and lead that pte to be orphan.
Since the uprobe pte will be remapped to the merged vma, we can remove the
unnecessary uprobe_mmap upon merged vma.
This problem was first found in linux-6.6.y and also exists in the
community syzkaller:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000ada39605a5e71711@google.com/T/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Fix memory leak due to multiple rx_stats allocation
rx_stats for each arsta is allocated when adding a station.
arsta->rx_stats will be freed when a station is removed.
Redundant allocations are occurring when the same station is added
multiple times. This causes ath12k_mac_station_add() to be called
multiple times, and rx_stats is allocated each time. As a result there
is memory leaks.
Prevent multiple allocations of rx_stats when ath12k_mac_station_add()
is called repeatedly by checking if rx_stats is already allocated
before allocating again. Allocate arsta->rx_stats if arsta->rx_stats
is NULL respectively.
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.3.1-00173-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.0.c5-00481-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau: fix a use-after-free in r535_gsp_rpc_push()
The RPC container is released after being passed to r535_gsp_rpc_send().
When sending the initial fragment of a large RPC and passing the
caller's RPC container, the container will be freed prematurely. Subsequent
attempts to send remaining fragments will therefore result in a
use-after-free.
Allocate a temporary RPC container for holding the initial fragment of a
large RPC when sending. Free the caller's container when all fragments
are successfully sent.
[ Rebase onto Blackwell changes. - Danilo ] |
