| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in amdgpu_coredump ring dump
The ring content dump in amdgpu_coredump() uses two separate loops over
adev->rings[]: the first counts rings with unsignalled fences to size
the allocation, and the second copies ring data into the allocated
buffers.
Both loops use the same condition to skip rings:
atomic_read(&ring->fence_drv.last_seq) == ring->fence_drv.sync_seq
Because last_seq is an atomic that is updated concurrently by the fence
signalling path, additional rings may appear unsignalled in the second
loop that were signalled during the first. When this happens, idx
exceeds the allocated ring_count and the store to coredump->rings[idx]
writes past the end of the kcalloc-ed buffer.
This was found during IGT stressful test amd_queue_reset which
triggers random GPU resets. The OVERSIZE subtest
(CMD_STREAM_EXEC_INVALID_PACKET_LENGTH_OVERSIZE on GFX ring) provokes
a ring timeout and subsequent coredump, which hits the race between
the counting and copying loops. The failure is non-deterministic and
depends on fence signalling timing during the reset.
KASAN log:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in amdgpu_coredump+0x1274/0x12f0 [amdgpu]
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106154258 by task kworker/u128:5/23625
CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 23625 Comm: kworker/u128:5 Not tainted 6.19.0+ #35
Workqueue: amdgpu-reset-dev drm_sched_job_timedout [gpu_sched]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xa5/0x110
print_report+0xd1/0x660
kasan_report+0xf3/0x130
__asan_report_store4_noabort+0x17/0x30
amdgpu_coredump+0x1274/0x12f0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_job_timedout+0xef0/0x16c0 [amdgpu]
drm_sched_job_timedout+0x194/0x5c0 [gpu_sched]
process_one_work+0x84b/0x1990
worker_thread+0x6b8/0x11b0
</TASK>
Allocated by task 23625:
kasan_save_stack+0x39/0x70
__kasan_kmalloc+0xc3/0xd0
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2ec/0x910
amdgpu_coredump+0x5c5/0x12f0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_job_timedout+0xef0/0x16c0 [amdgpu]
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106154200
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-09-96 of size 96
The buggy address is located 16 bytes to the right of
allocated 72-byte region [ffff888106154200, ffff888106154248)
72 bytes = 3 * sizeof(struct amdgpu_coredump_ring), so ring_count was 3
but idx reached 3+, writing ring_index (at struct offset 16) 16 bytes
past the allocation.
Fix by adding an idx < ring_count guard to the copy loop so it cannot
exceed the allocated count even when the fence state changes between
the two passes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: amd: acp-sdw-legacy: Bound DAI link iteration
create_sdw_dailinks() walks soc_dais until it finds an entry with
initialised cleared, but soc_dais is allocated with exactly num_ends
entries. If all entries are initialised, the loop reads past the end of
the array.
This was reported by KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mc_probe+0x26b3/0x2774 [snd_acp_sdw_legacy_mach]
Read of size 1
Pass the allocated entry count to create_sdw_dailinks() and stop before
reading past the array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: reject firmware sections with oversized data
In panthor_fw_load_section_entry(), the data size to copy is calculated
without validating it against the allocated section_size:
section->data.size = hdr.data.end - hdr.data.start;
If a crafted firmware sets data.size larger than the allocated memory,
this could cause a heap buffer overflow in panthor_fw_init_section_mem()
memcpy(section->mem->kmap, section->data.buf, section->data.size);
Additionally, if the section->data.size exceeds the BO size, could this
memset underflow the size calculation, leading to a massive out-of-bounds
zeroing of kernel memory?
memset(section->mem->kmap + section->data.size, 0,
panthor_kernel_bo_size(section->mem) - section->data.size);
Reject section entries whose initial data is larger than the section size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: validate firmware interface structure sizes
iface_fw_to_cpu_addr() only checks that the firmware-provided MCU virtual
address points inside the shared section. The returned pointer is later
used as a full firmware interface structure, so accepting an address near
the end of the shared section can still lead to out-of-bounds accesses.
Pass the expected object size to iface_fw_to_cpu_addr() and reject ranges
that do not fit entirely in the shared section. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: harden runlist realloc size calculations
Add a shared helper to safely convert runlist element counts to byte sizes
using overflow checks, and use it in both ntfs_rl_realloc() and
ntfs_rl_realloc_nofail(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/arm-smmu-v3-iommufd: Require exactly one Stream ID for a vDEVICE
arm_vsmmu_vsid_to_sid() maps a guest's vSID to a single physical Stream ID
taken from master->streams[0], assuming a device has exactly one stream. A
device with several streams gets only its first one mapped, so a guest vSID
invalidation cannot reach the others' ATC and IOTLB entries; a device with
none makes master->streams a ZERO_SIZE_PTR, read out of bounds.
Add an arm_vsmmu_vdevice_init() op to reject the vDEVICE with -EOPNOTSUPP
when master->num_streams is not one, rather than mapping it silently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: amd: acp-sdw-sof: Bound DAI link iteration
create_sdw_dailinks() walks sof_dais until it finds an entry with
initialised cleared, but sof_dais is allocated with exactly num_ends
entries. If all entries are initialised, the loop reads past the end of
the array.
Pass the allocated entry count to create_sdw_dailinks() and stop before
reading past the array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wcn36xx: fix OOB read from firmware count in PRINT_REG_INFO indication
The firmware-controlled rsp->count field is used as the loop bound for
indexing into the flexible rsp->regs[] array without validation against
the message length. A count exceeding the actual data causes out-of-
bounds reads from the heap-allocated message buffer.
Add a check that count fits within the received message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Clear rb node linkage when freeing bpf_rb_root
bpf_rb_root_free() detaches the root by copying the current rb_root_cached
and then replacing the live root with RB_ROOT_CACHED. It then walks the
copied root and drops each object contained in the tree.
This leaves the rb node state intact while dropping the object. If the
object is refcounted and survives the drop, its bpf_rb_node_kern still
contains an owner pointer to the freed root and stale rb tree linkage. If
a later bpf_rb_root allocation reuses the same address, bpf_rbtree_remove()
can incorrectly pass the owner check and call rb_erase_cached() on a node
whose rb pointers belong to the old tree.
Mirror the list draining behavior by marking nodes as busy while the root
is being detached, then clear the rb node and release the owner before
dropping the containing object. This makes surviving nodes unowned and
safe to reject from remove or accept for a later add. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix the reception of a reply packet before data transmission
Fix rxrpc_receiving_reply() to handle the reception of an apparent reply
DATA packet before rxrpc has had a chance to send any request DATA packets
on a client call by checking to see if the call has been exposed yet by
sending the first packet.
Without this, rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() might oops.
Also fix rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() to handle the Tx queue being empty by
changing the do...while loop into a while loop, just in case a call is
abnormally terminated by an early reply before the last request packet is
transmitted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling
rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the
call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers.
A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in
RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued.
In that state call->tx_top is zero and call->tx_queue is NULL, so
rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a
null-pointer dereference.
Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means:
(1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates
that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as
yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything
has been transmitted at least once, but we're now waiting for the
stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK'd (retransmissions may
still happen).
The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned
a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the
first packet is transmitted.
RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate
that all Tx packets have been ACK'd and we're now waiting for the
reply to be received.
(2) As per Wyatt Feng's original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks
that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx
buffer to ACK, but now this includes AWAIT_ACK rather than
AWAIT_REPLY. ACKALL packets are ignored if received in the wrong
state.
Note that unlike Wyatt Feng's patch, it's no longer necessary to check
to see if the Tx buffer exists as this the state set now covers this.
(3) Make the ACKALL handler use call->tx_transmitted rather than
call->tx_top as the former is explicitly the highest packet seq number
transmitted, whereas the latter has a looser definition.
Thanks to Jeffrey Altman for a description of the history of the ACKALL
packet[1]. |
| Inconsistent interpretation of http requests ('http request/response smuggling') in .NET allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. |
| Unchecked input for loop condition in .NET allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network. |
| Uncaught exception in .NET allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost/net: complete zerocopy ubufs only once
vhost-net initializes one ubuf_info per outstanding zerocopy TX
descriptor and hands it to the backend socket. The networking stack may
then clone a zerocopy skb before all skb references are released. For
example, batman-adv fragmentation reaches skb_split(), which calls
skb_zerocopy_clone() and increments the same ubuf_info refcount.
vhost_zerocopy_complete() currently treats every ubuf callback as a
completed vhost descriptor. It dereferences ubuf->ctx, writes the
descriptor completion state, and drops the vhost_net_ubuf_ref even when
the callback only releases a cloned skb reference. A backend reset can
therefore wait for and free the vhost_net_ubuf_ref while another cloned
skb still carries the same ubuf_info. A later completion then
dereferences the freed ubufs pointer.
KASAN reports the stale completion as:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vhost_zerocopy_complete+0x1d7/0x1f0
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vhost_zerocopy_complete+0x101/0x1f0
vhost_zerocopy_complete
skb_copy_ubufs
__dev_forward_skb2
veth_xmit
The freed object was allocated from vhost_net_ioctl() while setting the
backend and freed through kfree_rcu()/kvfree_rcu_bulk after backend
removal, while delayed skb completion still reached
vhost_zerocopy_complete().
Honor the generic ubuf_info refcount before touching vhost state, and run
the vhost descriptor completion only for the final ubuf reference. This
matches the msg_zerocopy_complete() ownership rule for cloned zerocopy
skbs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
configfs: fix lockless traversals of ->s_children
Having the parent directory locked protects entries from removal
by another thread, but it does *not* protect cursors from being
moved around by lseek() - or freed, for that matter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check
smb2_ioctl_query_info() validates the PASSTHRU_FSCTL response payload
before copying it to userspace.
The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds
check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.input_buffer_length directly, so
the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared
against the response buffer length.
A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount
to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copy_to_user()
then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer.
Use size_add() for the offset plus length check so overflow is treated as
out of bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free in same_client_has_lease()
same_client_has_lease() returns an opinfo pointer from ci->m_op_list
after dropping ci->m_lock without taking a reference.
smb_grant_oplock() then dereferences that pointer in copy_lease() and
when checking breaking_cnt. A concurrent close can remove the old lease
from ci->m_op_list and drop the last reference before the caller uses
the returned pointer, leading to a use-after-free.
Take a reference when same_client_has_lease() selects an existing lease,
drop any previous match while scanning, and release the returned
reference in smb_grant_oplock() after copying the lease state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race in unix socket mediation when peer_path is used
The holding a reference to the peer_sk is not enough to ensure access
to the peer sk path. Accessing the path outside of the state lock
allows for a race with unix_release_sock(). Fix this by taking the
state lock and getting a reference to the path under lock.
Ideally for connected sockets we would cache this information so we
don't have to take the lock here. But for now just fix the race. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix lack of locking around modifications of net->cells_dyn_ino
Fix the lack of locking around modifications of net->cells_dyn_ino by
taking net->cells_lock exclusively. This also requires to cell to be
removed from net->cells_dyn_ino in afs_destroy_cell_work() rather than in
afs_cell_destroy() as the latter runs in RCU cleanup context and sleeping
locks cannot be taken there. |
