| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: ets: clamp quantum in parse and fallback paths
ets_qdisc_change() falls back to psched_mtu() with no floor for bands
without an explicit quantum. With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len
reaches ~2 GiB, so a zero psched_mtu on a headerless device makes the
deficit-refill loop spin under the qdisc lock.
Move the floor into ets_quantum_parse() so explicitly configured quanta
are also clamped to [256, 1<<20], not just the fallback path.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
CONFIG_NET_SCH_ETS=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via
unshare -Urn suffices).
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root ets bands 3 strict 2 quanta 1 1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: cortina: Fix budget accounting
The gmac_rx() function returns the remaining NAPI budget, but its
caller treats the return value as the number of packets received. An
idle poll therefore reports a full budget and remains scheduled.
Return the number of received packets instead. Preserve the existing
free queue refill accounting by adding that count directly; continuing
to subtract it from the budget would invert the refill behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_api: Don't replay RTM_GETCHAIN in tc_ctl_chain().
If a netlink socket sends RTM_GETCHAIN requests repeatedly
without recv()ing the responses, tc_ctl_chain() hogs CPU and
triggers Hung Task splat. [0]
As caught in the stack trace, netlink_attachskb() could confuse
tc_ctl_chain() by returning -EAGAIN when the userspace netlink
socket's receive buffer is full.
The replay: label exists since commit 32a4f5ecd738 ("net: sched:
introduce chain object to uapi") but was not used initially.
Since commit 9f407f1768d3 ("net: sched: introduce chain templates"),
the label is needed for RTM_NEWCHAIN because tcf_proto_lookup_ops()
may release RTNL to call request_module().
However, the replay logic is unnecessary for RTM_GETCHAIN.
Let's apply the replay logic only for RTM_NEWCHAIN.
[0]:
INFO: task repro:1018 is blocked on a mutex likely owned by task repro:1022.
task:repro state:R running task stack:14096 pid:1022 tgid:1014 ppid:961 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00080000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? clockevents_program_event (kernel/time/clockevents.c:372)
? pskb_expand_head (net/core/skbuff.c:615)
? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1122)
? netlink_attachskb (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1323 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:1332 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232)
? __netlink_lookup (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:882 ./include/linux/rhashtable.h:711 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:499)
? tc_chain_notify (net/sched/cls_api.c:3045)
? tc_chain_notify (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1384 net/sched/cls_api.c:3041)
? netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335)
? rtnl_unicast (./include/net/netlink.h:1198 net/core/rtnetlink.c:985)
? tc_ctl_chain (net/sched/cls_api.c:3242)
? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7146)
? netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1354)
? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7177)
? netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556)
? netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319)
? netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900)
? __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:800)
? __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2281)
? __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2288 net/socket.c:2284 net/socket.c:2284)
? do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/drm_exec: fix up contended obj when num_objects is 0
drm_exec_prepare_array() silently returns success without calling
drm_exec_lock_contended() when num_objects is zero. This breaks the
invariant upheld by drm_exec_lock_obj(), where every entry point into
the locking sequence must first attempt to lock any previously
contended object before proceeding.
Drivers that chain multiple drm_exec_prepare_array() calls per
drm_exec_until_all_locked() iteration (e.g. amdgpu's userq signal/wait
ioctls, which prepare separate read and write BO arrays) can pass an
empty array for one of the two calls. If contention is hit while
preparing the non-empty array, exec->contended is set and the loop
retries; on retry, the empty-array call preceding it is a no-op that
never clears exec->contended, so drm_exec_retry_on_contention()
immediately jumps back to the top of the loop without ever reaching
the call that would resolve the contention. This spins forever.
Fix it by having drm_exec_prepare_array() call drm_exec_lock_contended()
directly when num_objects is zero, so a pending contended object dont
loop infinitely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix soft lockup polling continuation IOCB signature
qla27xx_copy_multiple_pkt() and qla27xx_copy_fpin_pkt() poll
rsp_q->ring_ptr->signature for RESPONSE_PROCESSED (0xDEADDEAD) to decide
whether the next continuation IOCB has arrived, spinning on cpu_relax()
without advancing the ring or decrementing the entry count while it has
not. response_t::signature lives at byte offset 60, but a continuation
IOCB (sts_cont_entry_t / struct sts_cont_entry_ext) carries raw FC frame
payload at that offset (data[56..59]). A received frame whose payload
bytes happen to equal 0xDEADDEAD is therefore misread as "not yet
arrived", and the loop spins forever in interrupt/DPC context, causing a
CPU soft lockup.
The poll is also unnecessary: callers of qla27xx_copy_multiple_pkt()
(PT_LS4_UNSOL and the NVMe purls path) already gate on
qla_chk_cont_iocb_avail(), which guarantees all entry_count IOCBs are
present before copying begins. The sibling helper
__qla_copy_purex_to_buffer() already drops the signature poll and relies
on the entry_type == STATUS_CONT_TYPE guard instead.
Remove the signature busy-wait from both helpers, keeping the entry_type
guard, and gate the FPIN path with qla_chk_cont_iocb_avail() so it defers
and re-processes on the next interrupt once all continuation IOCBs have
arrived, mirroring the ELS_AUTH_ELS and PT_LS4_UNSOL arms. With this the
signature field is never read on a continuation IOCB, eliminating the
payload-aliasing lockup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: 8250: fix possible ISR soft lockup
There are rare cases in which the host gets stuck in the ISR because it
is flooded with messages during the startup phase.
The reason for the soft lockup in the ISR is the missing FIFO error IRQ
(FIFOE) handling. Not handling it and reporting IRQ_HANDLED triggers
the IRQ immediately again.
Fix this by adding a check for the FIFOE status and clearing the FIFO
if no data is ready (DR).
This behavior was observed on an AM62L device which uses the OMAP 8250
driver. Fix it for all 8250 drivers, since the OMAP driver's special
IRQ setup handling may trigger this behavior more frequently, but it
is not ensured that other 8250 drivers aren't affected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ibm: emac: mal: fix potential system hang in mal_remove()
napi_disable() is not idempotent and calling it on an already-disabled
or unenabled NAPI context will cause the kernel to spin indefinitely
waiting for the NAPI_STATE_SCHED bit to clear.
In mal_remove(), napi_disable() is called unconditionally. If no MACs were
registered, NAPI was never enabled. Also, if they were registered but
subsequently unregistered, NAPI was already disabled in
mal_unregister_commac(). In either case, calling napi_disable() causes
the kernel to hang upon module removal.
Fix this by only calling napi_disable() in mal_remove() if the commac list
is not empty (which implies NAPI is enabled). |
| Asymmetric Resource Consumption vulnerability in Apache Directory LDAP API.
A LDAP server using the LDAP API (like Apache DS) may consume 100% of a CPU core indefinitely when processing some badly crafted Telephone Numbers.
This issue affects Apache Directory LDAP API: from 2.1.0 before 2.1.9.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.9, which fixes the issue. |
| Loop with unreachable exit condition ('infinite loop'), Improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes ('prototype pollution') vulnerability in Apache Thrift NodeJS bindings with TJSONProtocol.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue. |
| A vulnerability was detected in GraphicsMagick up to 1.3.47. Affected by this vulnerability is the function ExtractPostscript of the file coders/wpg.c of the component WPG File Handler. Performing a manipulation results in uncontrolled recursion. The attack may be initiated remotely. The patch is named 627b5b1b2fc2. It is suggested to install a patch to address this issue. The vendor was contacted early, responded in a very professional manner and quickly released a fixed version of the affected product. |
| Uncaught exception, Loop with unreachable exit condition ('infinite loop'), Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) vulnerability in Apache Thrift D language bindings.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue. |
| figlet.js is a FIG driver written in JavaScript that aims to implement the FIGfont specification. Prior to 1.11.3, text() and textSync() can enter an unbounded loop when whitespaceBreak is enabled and width is smaller than the rendered width of a single FIGlet character. Under these conditions, breakWord() cannot find a valid break point and returns without consuming a character, so generateFigTextLines() repeatedly processes the same input while consuming CPU and growing memory. The non-default option and attacker-controlled width must both reach an affected call. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.3. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow, Incorrect bitwise shift of integer vulnerability in Apache Thrift C++ THeaderProtocol.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: fix handling of damaged volume in exfat_create_upcase_table()
When the size of the upcase table is set to zero in the dentry for any
reason(e.g. corrupted media or misbehaving device), an integer overflow
causes the module to loop indefinitely.
If the size of the upcase table is read zero, do not attempt to load the
table. Instead, fallback to loading the default upcase table. If the
size of the upcase table is zero or no upcase table is found, raise
exfat_fs_error() to mark the volume read-only. |
| iperf3 versions prior to 3.22 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to crash-loop the server's UDP receive worker into an unrecoverable infinite loop by sending a single crafted control-channel parameter message followed by one 16-byte UDP datagram. Attackers can permanently pin the affected per-stream receive thread at approximately 100% CPU usage, rendering the server unusable until forcibly killed with SIGKILL, as the process does not respond to normal control-channel closure. |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.19422 doS attack was possible via crafted PSD attachments |
| `_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length > 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes.
Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls.
**Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one.
**Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow — `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case.
**One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte.
During a runaway walk, stray bytes parsing as a link-layer address option are copied into the neighbor cache (`nx_icmpv6_process_ns.c:280, :293`) and subsequently used as the destination MAC for frames to that neighbour, placing off-packet memory on the link. Confirmed by inspection, not reproduced. |
| Unbounded PPP IPCP Option Parsing Causes a Worker Stall and Out-of-bounds Read |
| Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel in the ADS discovery of the Go implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4Go) allows an attacker able to send UDP datagrams to the discovering host to redirect subsequent connections to an arbitrary, attacker-chosen address. The discovery result's connection
address was derived from the AmsNetId claimed in the response body rather than from the datagram's actual source address. One spoofed discovery response can therefore insert an inventory entry pointing at any host, including hosts outside the local network, and an application that connects to discovered devices
will open its ADS session, including any configured route credentials, to that host.
Additionally, discovery listeners in both implementations can be disabled by a single malformed datagram:
- In PLC4Go ADS discovery, a short version block causes a panic that ends the listener for the rest of the discovery call, so legitimate devices answering afterwards are not reported.
- In PLC4J, the ADS and EtherNet/IP discoverers stop on an unhandled exception from a malformed response.
- The PLC4J Modbus discoverer can be made to spin indefinitely, consuming a CPU core, by a scanned host that sends a partial response.
Exploitation requires the application to invoke the discovery API, which is opt-in, and for the connection redirect, to act on the discovered items.
This issue affects Apache PLC4X: PLC4Go from 0.11.0 before 1.0.0; PLC4J ADS and Modbus drivers from 0.10.0 before 1.0.0; PLC4J EtherNet/IP driver from 0.11.0 before 1.0.0. PLC4Go is consumed as the Go module github.com/apache/plc4x/plc4go; versions refer to the corresponding Apache PLC4X releases.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue. Version 1.0.0 derives the connection address from the datagram's source address and logs a warning when the claimed AmsNetId disagrees with it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/pagemap: Prevent double migration of device pages
A device-private folio migrated to system memory by a CPU fault can
remain reachable through the raw-PFN eviction path until migration
finalization drops the source reference.
If eviction selects the same device-private folio during this window,
it can attempt to migrate the folio again. The second migration can leave
an uncharged folio on an LRU list, causing folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave() to
retry indefinitely and resulting in a soft lockup and RCU stall.
Mark successfully migrated device-private folios using a low bit of
their zone_device_data before migration finalization. Make both CPU-fault
and raw-PFN migration paths skip device-private folios carrying this
flag.
Mask the flag when retrieving the drm_pagemap_zdd pointer and preserve
it when a device-private folio is split. Keeping the state on the physical
folio also avoids depending on a virtual address that may change before a
fault occurs.
v2:
- Replace the retired-PFN XArray with an embedded bitmap. (Matthew Brost)
- Mark every base page covered by a migrated folio so retirement remains
valid if the folio is later split.
v3:
- Store the migrated state in a low bit of zone_device_data instead of
adding virtual-range and bitmap tracking to the ZDD. (Matthew Brost)
- Mask the flag when retrieving the ZDD and preserve it when splitting
a folio.
- Drop the pre-existing fixes already covered by Matthew Brost's series:
https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/171651/
v4:
- Advance by the folio size only for migration entries marked with
MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND. (Sashiko)
v5:
- Simplify ZDD flag updates and folio iteration. (Matthew Brost)
- Skip retired device-private folios in the CPU-fault path. (Matthew Brost)
- Preserve flag bits while taking a new ZDD reference for split folios.
v6:
- Restore MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND-aware stepping so non-compound migration
entries are processed one at a time. (Sashiko)
- Drop the pre-existing fixes already covered by Matthew Brost's series:
https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/171651/
The lockup was observed as:
[10109.860465] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u65:5:6557]
[10109.860524] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [O]=OOT_MODULE
[10109.860524] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z790-P WIFI, BIOS 0812 02/24/2023
[10109.860525] Workqueue: xe_page_fault_work_queue xe_pagefault_queue_work [xe]
[10109.860644] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x57/0x80
[10109.860655] Call Trace:
[10109.860655] <TASK>
[10109.860657] folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x216/0x220
[10109.860661] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[10109.860665] folio_batch_move_lru+0xc8/0x450
[10109.860670] ? lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2d0
[10109.860674] ? __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x60/0x2e0
[10109.860677] ? folio_migrate_mapping+0xa6/0x110
[10109.860679] ? folio_migrate_flags+0x13b/0x1b0
[10109.860681] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[10109.860683] __folio_batch_add_and_move+0xe7/0x2e0
[10109.860685] ? dma_iova_try_alloc+0xb0/0x140
[10109.860689] folio_add_lru+0x64/0x80
[10109.860691] __migrate_device_finalize+0x12c/0x270
[10109.860695] migrate_device_finalize+0x10/0x20
[10109.860698] drm_pagemap_evict_to_ram+0x185/0x370 [drm_gpusvm_helper]
[10109.860704] ? drm_pagemap_evict_to_ram+0x96/0x370 [drm_gpusvm_helper]
[10109.860709] xe_svm_bo_evict+0x15/0x20 [xe]
[10109.860819] ? xe_svm_bo_evict+0x15/0x20 [xe]
[10109.860921] xe_bo_move+0x107e/0x1570 [xe]
[10109.860992] ? xe_ttm_tt_create+0x168/0x340 [xe]
[10109.861059] ? __up_read+0x98/0x2b0
[10109.861061] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa3/0x130
[10109.861067] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xe8/0x1e0 [ttm]
[10109.861075] ttm_bo_evict+0x141/0x1c0 [ttm]
[10109.861081] ttm_bo_evict_cb+0x9f/0x100 [ttm]
[10109.861086] ttm_lru_walk_for_evict+0x84/0x190 [ttm]
[10109.861091] ? xe_ttm_vram_mgr_new+0x258/0x3a0 [xe]
[10109.861198] ttm_bo_alloc_resource+0x219/0
---truncated--- |
