| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| LogicalDOC Community Edition through 9.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the default-enabled XMLConverter that fetches xml-stylesheet href URLs without scheme or host allowlisting. Authenticated users can upload XML documents whose stylesheet href points to internal http, ftp, file, or jar URLs, forcing server requests and applying attacker-controlled XSLT during conversion. |
| A vulnerability has been found in Netcore NR268 1.7.121109. This affects the function filter_arp_put_file_cgi of the file /router/filter_arp_put_file.cgi. The manipulation of the argument put_file leads to out-of-bounds read. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| Tinyexr through 3.2.0 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in ParseEXRMultipartHeaderFromMemory() that allows attackers to read beyond buffers due to a stale remaining-size value. Attackers can supply a crafted multi-part EXR file whose later part headers bypass ReadAttribute() bounds checks, crashing applications or leaking adjacent heap memory into attribute values. |
| VeraCrypt 1.26.29 (FUSE-T build) on macOS sometimes allows unintended access to decrypted data. It does not terminate the FUSE-T auxiliary service (go-nfsv4) and its associated VeraCrypt core-service helper processes when a volume is dismounted. After VeraCrypt reports the volume as dismounted, the auxiliary mount continues to serve the decrypted volume image (volume.dmg) over a loopback SMB session, and the leaked processes retain an open handle to the underlying raw device. A local user or process can therefore remount and access the decrypted volume without the passphrase, e.g., by reopening a previously accessed path (such as through a macOS Open Recent menu) or by attaching volume.dmg from the stale auxiliary mount. (The macFUSE build of VeraCrypt is not affected.) |
| Weak authentication in Microsoft Exchange Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| When `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` was configured, a hostname matching the allow list was accepted without checking its resolved address against the local-network restrictions. A user who can start repository migrations and control the DNS of an allowed hostname could make it resolve to loopback or private addresses and bypass `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`, reaching internal services from the Gitea server. Instances without `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configured are not affected by this specific bypass. |
| omarchy-theme-set in Omarchy 4 before 4.0.1 allows code execution via a third-party theme because the files placed into ~/.local/state/omarchy/current/theme may include executable content from an untrusted Git repository. |
| Gitea's repository migration and pull mirror egress checks could be bypassed with a hostname that returns multiple DNS answers, because the address that was validated was not necessarily the address Git later connected to. A low-privileged user who can create migrations or mirrors could direct the server to internal services, reading from and writing to reachable internal Git or HTTP endpoints. Content from internal responses could additionally be disclosed through migration and mirror error messages. |
| When Gitea's built-in SSH server is enabled (`START_SSH_SERVER = true`), the presented public key was looked up with an SQL `LIKE` comparison of its encoded content, which is case-insensitive on some databases, including the default SQLite. An attacker who can construct a case variant of another user's registered RSA public key for which they can derive the private key could have that key matched to the victim's account and authenticate over SSH as that user. Keys are now looked up by fingerprint. |
| Gitea's container registry served blob downloads with a `Content-Type` taken from the media type declared in pushed image manifests, without a `Content-Disposition` or restrictive content security policy. A user who can push container images can publish a blob containing HTML and JavaScript with a `text/html` media type. When a victim who is authenticated to the instance opens the blob URL in a browser, the script runs on the Gitea origin and can perform actions as the victim, such as creating API tokens. |
| When a Gitea Actions run was inserted, older runs in the same workflow-level concurrency group were cancelled without checking whether the new run still needed approval. Because fork pull request runs are inserted under the base repository, a user who can open a pull request from a fork could cancel trusted in-progress runs that share a concurrency group with `cancel-in-progress` enabled, without approval and without running any code. On self-hosted runners this can interrupt deployments and leave partial state behind. |
| In the WibuKey driver for Windows below Version 6.72, insufficient validation of user input when calculating the size of a kernel buffer could cause small amounts of data to be written outside the intended kernel buffer. This can lead to a system crash. Under unfavorable circumstances, adjacent kernel memory may be modified. |
| A improper validation of certificate with host mismatch vulnerability in Fortinet FortiOS 7.6.1 through 7.6.6, FortiProxy 7.6.2 through 7.6.6 may allow attacker to information disclosure via <insert attack vector here> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_api: use RCU with deferred freeing for action lifecycle
When NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER are run concurrently it is possible to create a
race with an associated action.
Let's illustrate with CPU0 running NEWTFILTER and CPU1 running DELFILTER:
0: mutex_lock() <-- holds the idr lock
0: rcu_read_lock()
0: p = idr_find(idr, index) <-- action p is valid (RCU protects IDR)
0: mutex_unlock() <-- releases the idr lock
1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held
1: idr_remove(idr, index) <-- Action removed from IDR
1: mutex_unlock() <-- mutex released allowing us to delete the action
1: tcf_action_cleanup(p); kfree(p) <-- Kfrees p immediately, no deferral
0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- ouch, UAF p points to freed memory
This patch fixes the race condition between NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER by
adding struct rcu_head to tc_action used in the deferral and introducing a
call_rcu() in the delete path to defer the final kfree().
Note: this is a revert of commit d7fb60b9cafb ("net_sched: get rid of tcfa_rcu")
but also modernization/simplification to directly use kfree_rcu().
Let's illustrate the new restored code path:
0: rcu_read_lock()
1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held
1: idr_remove(idr, index)
1: mutex_unlock()
1: call_rcu(&p->tcfa_rcu, tcf_action_rcu_free) <-- defer kfree after grace period
0: p = idr_find(idr, index)
0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- fails, refcnt already 0
1: rcu_read_unlock() <-- release so freeing can run after grace period
After CPU1 calls idr_remove(), the object is no longer reachable through the IDR.
CPU0's subsequent idr_find() will return NULL, and even if it still held a
stale pointer, the immediate kfree() is now deferred until after the RCU grace
period, so no UAF can occur. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL
A deferred byte-range lock (an SMB2_LOCK that blocks) registers an async work on
conn->async_requests via setup_async_work(), with cancel_fn =
smb2_remove_blocked_lock and cancel_argv[0] pointing at the struct file_lock.
When the request is cancelled, the worker frees the file_lock with
locks_free_lock() and takes the cancelled early-exit, which "goto out"s and never
reaches release_async_work() -- the only site that unlinks the work from
conn->async_requests and clears cancel_fn/cancel_argv. The work therefore stays
matchable on async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing at the freed file_lock,
until connection teardown finally runs release_async_work().
smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn unconditionally with no state guard, so a second
SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId, arriving in that window, re-runs
smb2_remove_blocked_lock() on the freed file_lock -- a slab use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block
__locks_delete_block
locks_delete_block
ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock
smb2_remove_blocked_lock
smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn
handle_ksmbd_work
Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock
Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (cancelled branch)
... cache file_lock_cache of size 192
Reproduced on mainline with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client.
Skip a work whose state is already KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED so its cancel callback
cannot be fired a second time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
quota: Fix race of dquot_scan_active() with quota deactivation
dquot_scan_active() can race with quota deactivation in
quota_release_workfn() like:
CPU0 (quota_release_workfn) CPU1 (dquot_scan_active)
============================== ==============================
spin_lock(&dq_list_lock);
list_replace_init(
&releasing_dquots, &rls_head);
/* dquot X on rls_head,
dq_count == 0,
DQ_ACTIVE_B still set */
spin_unlock(&dq_list_lock);
synchronize_srcu(&dquot_srcu);
spin_lock(&dq_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(dquot,
&inuse_list, dq_inuse) {
/* finds dquot X */
dquot_active(X) -> true
atomic_inc(&X->dq_count);
}
spin_unlock(&dq_list_lock);
spin_lock(&dq_list_lock);
dquot = list_first_entry(&rls_head);
WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&dquot->dq_count));
The problem is not only a cosmetic one as under memory pressure the
caller of dquot_scan_active() can end up working on freed dquot.
Fix the problem by making sure the dquot is removed from releasing list
when we acquire a reference to it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic
The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of
the task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and
makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm.
And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task
has a mm pointer.
But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable' to
check various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically
explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). Including for
threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel
threads).
It's not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is.
The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to
be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the
traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference for
this all.
Make it all make a *bit* more sense by saying that if you don't have a
MM pointer, we'll use a cached "last dumpability" flag if the thread
ever had a MM (it will be zero for kernel threads since it is never
set), and require a proper CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to override. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption
tcf_pedit_act() computes the COW range for skb_ensure_writable()
once before the key loop using tcfp_off_max_hint, but the hint does
not account for the runtime header offset added by typed keys. This
can leave part of the write region un-COW'd.
Fix by moving skb_ensure_writable() inside the per-key loop where
the actual write offset is known, and add overflow checking on the
offset arithmetic. For negative offsets (e.g. Ethernet header edits
at ingress), use skb_cow() to COW the headroom instead. Guard
offset_valid() against INT_MIN, where negation is undefined. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tun: free page on short-frame rejection in tun_xdp_one()
tun_xdp_one() returns -EINVAL on a frame shorter than ETH_HLEN without
freeing the page that vhost_net_build_xdp() allocated for it.
tun_sendmsg() discards that -EINVAL and still returns total_len, so
vhost_tx_batch() takes the success path and never frees the page; each
short frame in a batch leaks one page-frag chunk.
A local process that can open /dev/net/tun and /dev/vhost-net can hit
this path: it attaches a tun/tap device as the vhost-net backend and
feeds TX descriptors whose length minus the virtio-net header is below
ETH_HLEN. Each kick leaks the page-frag chunks for that batch, and a
tight submission loop exhausts host memory and triggers an OOM panic.
Free the page before returning -EINVAL, matching the XDP-program error
path in the same function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath5k: do not access array OOB
Vincent reports:
> The ath5k driver seems to do an array-index-out-of-bounds access as
> shown by the UBSAN kernel message:
> UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath5k/base.c:1741:20
> index 4 is out of range for type 'ieee80211_tx_rate [4]'
> ...
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
> ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x2b
> __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x46/0x4b
> ath5k_tasklet_tx+0x4e0/0x560 [ath5k]
> tasklet_action_common+0xb5/0x1c0
It is real. 'ts->ts_final_idx' can be 3 on 5212, so:
info->status.rates[ts->ts_final_idx + 1].idx = -1;
with the array defined as:
struct ieee80211_tx_rate rates[IEEE80211_TX_MAX_RATES];
while the size is:
#define IEEE80211_TX_MAX_RATES 4
is indeed bogus.
Set this 'idx = -1' sentinel only if the array index is less than the
array size. As mac80211 will not look at rates beyond the size
(IEEE80211_TX_MAX_RATES).
Note: The effect of the OOB write is negligible. It just overwrites the
next member of info->status, i.e. ack_signal. |
