| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix NULL pointer dereference on fastopen early fallback
In case of early fallback to TCP, subflow_syn_recv_sock() deletes
the subflow context before returning the newly allocated sock to
the caller.
The fastopen path does not cope with the above unconditionally
dereferencing the subflow context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: use work to update rate to avoid RCU warning
The ieee80211_ops::sta_rc_update must be atomic, because
ieee80211_chan_bw_change() holds rcu_read lock while calling
drv_sta_rc_update(), so create a work to do original things.
Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 4621 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:318
rcu_note_context_switch+0x571/0x5d0
CPU: 0 PID: 4621 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G W OE
Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_chswitch_work [mac80211]
RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x571/0x5d0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0xb0/0x1460
? __mod_timer+0x116/0x360
schedule+0x5a/0xc0
schedule_timeout+0x87/0x150
? trace_raw_output_tick_stop+0x60/0x60
wait_for_completion_timeout+0x7b/0x140
usb_start_wait_urb+0x82/0x160 [usbcore
usb_control_msg+0xe3/0x140 [usbcore
rtw_usb_read+0x88/0xe0 [rtw_usb
rtw_usb_read8+0xf/0x10 [rtw_usb
rtw_fw_send_h2c_command+0xa0/0x170 [rtw_core
rtw_fw_send_ra_info+0xc9/0xf0 [rtw_core
drv_sta_rc_update+0x7c/0x160 [mac80211
ieee80211_chan_bw_change+0xfb/0x110 [mac80211
ieee80211_change_chanctx+0x38/0x130 [mac80211
ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_switch+0x34e/0x900 [mac80211
ieee80211_link_use_reserved_context+0x88/0xe0 [mac80211
ieee80211_chswitch_work+0x95/0x170 [mac80211
process_one_work+0x201/0x410
worker_thread+0x4a/0x3b0
? process_one_work+0x410/0x410
kthread+0xe1/0x110
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix invalid free tracking in ext4_xattr_move_to_block()
In ext4_xattr_move_to_block(), the value of the extended attribute
which we need to move to an external block may be allocated by
kvmalloc() if the value is stored in an external inode. So at the end
of the function the code tried to check if this was the case by
testing entry->e_value_inum.
However, at this point, the pointer to the xattr entry is no longer
valid, because it was removed from the original location where it had
been stored. So we could end up calling kvfree() on a pointer which
was not allocated by kvmalloc(); or we could also potentially leak
memory by not freeing the buffer when it should be freed. Fix this by
storing whether it should be freed in a separate variable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Prevent handling any completions after qp destroy
HW may generate completions that indicates QP is destroyed.
Driver should not be scheduling any more completion handlers
for this QP, after the QP is destroyed. Since CQs are active
during the QP destroy, driver may still schedule completion
handlers. This can cause a race where the destroy_cq and poll_cq
running simultaneously.
Snippet of kernel panic while doing bnxt_re driver load unload in loop.
This indicates a poll after the CQ is freed.
[77786.481636] Call Trace:
[77786.481640] <TASK>
[77786.481644] bnxt_re_poll_cq+0x14a/0x620 [bnxt_re]
[77786.481658] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
[77786.481693] __ib_process_cq+0x57/0x190 [ib_core]
[77786.481728] ib_cq_poll_work+0x26/0x80 [ib_core]
[77786.481761] process_one_work+0x1e5/0x3f0
[77786.481768] worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0
[77786.481785] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[77786.481790] kthread+0xe2/0x110
[77786.481794] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[77786.481797] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
To avoid this, complete all completion handlers before returning the
destroy QP. If free_cq is called soon after destroy_qp, IB stack
will cancel the CQ work before invoking the destroy_cq verb and
this will prevent any race mentioned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: essiv - Handle EBUSY correctly
As it is essiv only handles the special return value of EINPROGERSS,
which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the
request.
However, as the caller of essiv may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need
to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged
requests will trigger a use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Do not add the same hwpt to the ioas->hwpt_list twice
The hwpt is added to the hwpt_list only during its creation, it is never
added again. This hunk is some missed leftover from rework. Adding it
twice will corrupt the linked list in some cases.
It effects HWPT specific attachment, which is something the test suite
cannot cover until we can create a legitimate struct device with a
non-system iommu "driver" (ie we need the bus removed from the iommu code) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/64s: Fix VAS mm use after free
The refcount on mm is dropped before the coprocessor is detached. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix wrong fallback logic for FDIR
When adding a FDIR filter, if ice_vc_fdir_set_irq_ctx returns failure,
the inserted fdir entry will not be removed and if ice_vc_fdir_write_fltr
returns failure, the fdir context info for irq handler will not be cleared
which may lead to inconsistent or memory leak issue. This patch refines
failure cases to resolve this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/psi: use kernfs polling functions for PSI trigger polling
Destroying psi trigger in cgroup_file_release causes UAF issues when
a cgroup is removed from under a polling process. This is happening
because cgroup removal causes a call to cgroup_file_release while the
actual file is still alive. Destroying the trigger at this point would
also destroy its waitqueue head and if there is still a polling process
on that file accessing the waitqueue, it will step on the freed pointer:
do_select
vfs_poll
do_rmdir
cgroup_rmdir
kernfs_drain_open_files
cgroup_file_release
cgroup_pressure_release
psi_trigger_destroy
wake_up_pollfree(&t->event_wait)
// vfs_poll is unblocked
synchronize_rcu
kfree(t)
poll_freewait -> UAF access to the trigger's waitqueue head
Patch [1] fixed this issue for epoll() case using wake_up_pollfree(),
however the same issue exists for synchronous poll() case.
The root cause of this issue is that the lifecycles of the psi trigger's
waitqueue and of the file associated with the trigger are different. Fix
this by using kernfs_generic_poll function when polling on cgroup-specific
psi triggers. It internally uses kernfs_open_node->poll waitqueue head
with its lifecycle tied to the file's lifecycle. This also renders the
fix in [1] obsolete, so revert it.
[1] commit c2dbe32d5db5 ("sched/psi: Fix use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue()") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix stack overflow when LRO is disabled for virtual interfaces
When the virtual interface's feature is updated, it synchronizes the
updated feature for its own lower interface.
This propagation logic should be worked as the iteration, not recursively.
But it works recursively due to the netdev notification unexpectedly.
This problem occurs when it disables LRO only for the team and bonding
interface type.
team0
|
+------+------+-----+-----+
| | | | |
team1 team2 team3 ... team200
If team0's LRO feature is updated, it generates the NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE
event to its own lower interfaces(team1 ~ team200).
It is worked by netdev_sync_lower_features().
So, the NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE notification logic of each lower interface
work iteratively.
But generated NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE event is also sent to the upper
interface too.
upper interface(team0) generates the NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE event for its own
lower interfaces again.
lower and upper interfaces receive this event and generate this
event again and again.
So, the stack overflow occurs.
But it is not the infinite loop issue.
Because the netdev_sync_lower_features() updates features before
generating the NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE event.
Already synchronized lower interfaces skip notification logic.
So, it is just the problem that iteration logic is changed to the
recursive unexpectedly due to the notification mechanism.
Reproducer:
ip link add team0 type team
ethtool -K team0 lro on
for i in {1..200}
do
ip link add team$i master team0 type team
ethtool -K team$i lro on
done
ethtool -K team0 lro off
In order to fix it, the notifier_ctx member of bonding/team is introduced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udplite: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __sk_mem_raise_allocated().
syzbot reported [0] a null-ptr-deref in sk_get_rmem0() while using
IPPROTO_UDPLITE (0x88):
14:25:52 executing program 1:
r0 = socket$inet6(0xa, 0x80002, 0x88)
We had a similar report [1] for probably sk_memory_allocated_add()
in __sk_mem_raise_allocated(), and commit c915fe13cbaa ("udplite: fix
NULL pointer dereference") fixed it by setting .memory_allocated for
udplite_prot and udplitev6_prot.
To fix the variant, we need to set either .sysctl_wmem_offset or
.sysctl_rmem.
Now UDP and UDPLITE share the same value for .memory_allocated, so we
use the same .sysctl_wmem_offset for UDP and UDPLITE.
[0]:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 0 PID: 6829 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/28/2023
RIP: 0010:sk_get_rmem0 include/net/sock.h:2907 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__sk_mem_raise_allocated+0x806/0x17a0 net/core/sock.c:3006
Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 23 0f 00 00 48 8b 44 24 08 48 8b 98 38 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 da 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 d8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 0f 8d 6f 0a 00 00 8b
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005d7f450 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90004d92000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff88066482 RDI: ffffffff8e2ccbb8
RBP: ffff8880173f7000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000030000
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000340 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0063) knlGS:00000000f7f1cb40
CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000002e82f000 CR3: 0000000034ff0000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sk_mem_schedule+0x6c/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3077
udp_rmem_schedule net/ipv4/udp.c:1539 [inline]
__udp_enqueue_schedule_skb+0x776/0xb30 net/ipv4/udp.c:1581
__udpv6_queue_rcv_skb net/ipv6/udp.c:666 [inline]
udpv6_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xc39/0x16c0 net/ipv6/udp.c:775
udpv6_queue_rcv_skb+0x194/0xa10 net/ipv6/udp.c:793
__udp6_lib_mcast_deliver net/ipv6/udp.c:906 [inline]
__udp6_lib_rcv+0x1bda/0x2bd0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1013
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2e7/0x1250 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:437
ip6_input_finish+0x150/0x2f0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:482
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:297 [inline]
ip6_input+0xa0/0xd0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491
ip6_mc_input+0x40b/0xf50 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:585
dst_input include/net/dst.h:468 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:297 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x250/0x380 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x114/0x180 net/core/dev.c:5491
__netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:5605
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5691 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x133/0x7a0 net/core/dev.c:5750
tun_rx_batched+0x4b3/0x7a0 drivers/net/tun.c:1553
tun_get_user+0x2452/0x39c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1989
tun_chr_write_iter+0xdf/0x200 drivers/net/tun.c:2035
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1868 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x945/0xd50 fs/read_write.c:584
ksys_write+0x12b/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:112 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0x65/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:178
do_fast_syscall_32+0x33/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:203
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x70/0x82
RIP: 0023:0xf7f21579
Code: b8 01 10 06 03 74 b4 01 10 07 03 74 b0 01 10 08 03 74 d8 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix potential use-after-free bug when trimming caps
When trimming the caps and just after the 'session->s_cap_lock' is
released in ceph_iterate_session_caps() the cap maybe removed by
another thread, and when using the stale cap memory in the callbacks
it will trigger use-after-free crash.
We need to check the existence of the cap just after the 'ci->i_ceph_lock'
being acquired. And do nothing if it's already removed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: soc-compress: Reposition and add pcm_mutex
If panic_on_warn is set and compress stream(DPCM) is started,
then kernel panic occurred because card->pcm_mutex isn't held appropriately.
In the following functions, warning were issued at this line
"snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held".
static int dpcm_be_connect(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe,
struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *be, int stream)
{
...
snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(fe);
...
}
void dpcm_be_disconnect(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int stream)
{
...
snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(fe);
...
}
void snd_soc_runtime_action(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *rtd,
int stream, int action)
{
...
snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(rtd);
...
}
int dpcm_dapm_stream_event(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int dir,
int event)
{
...
snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(fe);
...
}
These functions are called by soc_compr_set_params_fe, soc_compr_open_fe
and soc_compr_free_fe
without pcm_mutex locking. And this is call stack.
[ 414.527841][ T2179] pc : dpcm_process_paths+0x5a4/0x750
[ 414.527848][ T2179] lr : dpcm_process_paths+0x37c/0x750
[ 414.527945][ T2179] Call trace:
[ 414.527949][ T2179] dpcm_process_paths+0x5a4/0x750
[ 414.527955][ T2179] soc_compr_open_fe+0xb0/0x2cc
[ 414.527972][ T2179] snd_compr_open+0x180/0x248
[ 414.527981][ T2179] snd_open+0x15c/0x194
[ 414.528003][ T2179] chrdev_open+0x1b0/0x220
[ 414.528023][ T2179] do_dentry_open+0x30c/0x594
[ 414.528045][ T2179] vfs_open+0x34/0x44
[ 414.528053][ T2179] path_openat+0x914/0xb08
[ 414.528062][ T2179] do_filp_open+0xc0/0x170
[ 414.528068][ T2179] do_sys_openat2+0x94/0x18c
[ 414.528076][ T2179] __arm64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa4
[ 414.528084][ T2179] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x10c
[ 414.528094][ T2179] el0_svc_common+0xbc/0x104
[ 414.528099][ T2179] do_el0_svc+0x34/0xd8
[ 414.528103][ T2179] el0_svc+0x34/0xc4
[ 414.528125][ T2179] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x8c/0xfc
[ 414.528133][ T2179] el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4
[ 414.528142][ T2179] Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
So, I reposition and add pcm_mutex to resolve lockdep error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix skb refcnt race after locking changes
There is a race where skb's from the sk_psock_backlog can be referenced
after userspace side has already skb_consumed() the sk_buff and its refcnt
dropped to zer0 causing use after free.
The flow is the following:
while ((skb = skb_peek(&psock->ingress_skb))
sk_psock_handle_Skb(psock, skb, ..., ingress)
if (!ingress) ...
sk_psock_skb_ingress
sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(skb)
msg->skb = skb
sk_psock_queue_msg(psock, msg)
skb_dequeue(&psock->ingress_skb)
The sk_psock_queue_msg() puts the msg on the ingress_msg queue. This is
what the application reads when recvmsg() is called. An application can
read this anytime after the msg is placed on the queue. The recvmsg hook
will also read msg->skb and then after user space reads the msg will call
consume_skb(skb) on it effectively free'ing it.
But, the race is in above where backlog queue still has a reference to
the skb and calls skb_dequeue(). If the skb_dequeue happens after the
user reads and free's the skb we have a use after free.
The !ingress case does not suffer from this problem because it uses
sendmsg_*(sk, msg) which does not pass the sk_buff further down the
stack.
The following splat was observed with 'test_progs -t sockmap_listen':
[ 1022.710250][ T2556] general protection fault, ...
[...]
[ 1022.712830][ T2556] Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
[ 1022.713262][ T2556] RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue+0x4c/0x80
[ 1022.713653][ T2556] Code: ...
[...]
[ 1022.720699][ T2556] Call Trace:
[ 1022.720984][ T2556] <TASK>
[ 1022.721254][ T2556] ? die_addr+0x32/0x80^M
[ 1022.721589][ T2556] ? exc_general_protection+0x25a/0x4b0
[ 1022.722026][ T2556] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
[ 1022.722489][ T2556] ? skb_dequeue+0x4c/0x80
[ 1022.722854][ T2556] sk_psock_backlog+0x27a/0x300
[ 1022.723243][ T2556] process_one_work+0x2a7/0x5b0
[ 1022.723633][ T2556] worker_thread+0x4f/0x3a0
[ 1022.723998][ T2556] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 1022.724386][ T2556] kthread+0xfd/0x130
[ 1022.724709][ T2556] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1022.725066][ T2556] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[ 1022.725409][ T2556] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1022.725799][ T2556] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[ 1022.726201][ T2556] </TASK>
To fix we add an skb_get() before passing the skb to be enqueued in the
engress queue. This bumps the skb->users refcnt so that consume_skb()
and kfree_skb will not immediately free the sk_buff. With this we can
be sure the skb is still around when we do the dequeue. Then we just
need to decrement the refcnt or free the skb in the backlog case which
we do by calling kfree_skb() on the ingress case as well as the sendmsg
case.
Before locking change from fixes tag we had the sock locked so we
couldn't race with user and there was no issue here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Avoid use-after-free in dbg for hci_add_adv_monitor()
KSAN reports use-after-free in hci_add_adv_monitor().
While adding an adv monitor,
hci_add_adv_monitor() calls ->
msft_add_monitor_pattern() calls ->
msft_add_monitor_sync() calls ->
msft_le_monitor_advertisement_cb() calls in an error case ->
hci_free_adv_monitor() which frees the *moniter.
This is referenced by bt_dev_dbg() in hci_add_adv_monitor().
Fix the bt_dev_dbg() by using handle instead of monitor->handle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_disconnect_{req,rsp}
Similar to commit d0be8347c623 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free
caused by l2cap_chan_put"), just use l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero to
prevent referencing a channel that is about to be destroyed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: annotate lockless accesses to nlk->max_recvmsg_len
syzbot reported a data-race in data-race in netlink_recvmsg() [1]
Indeed, netlink_recvmsg() can be run concurrently,
and netlink_dump() also needs protection.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_recvmsg / netlink_recvmsg
read to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23057 on cpu 0:
netlink_recvmsg+0xea/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline]
__sys_recvfrom+0x1ee/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2194
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2212 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2208 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x78/0x90 net/socket.c:2208
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
write to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23037 on cpu 1:
netlink_recvmsg+0x114/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1989
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline]
____sys_recvmsg+0x156/0x310 net/socket.c:2720
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2762 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x2e5/0x710 net/socket.c:2856
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:2951
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000001000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00195-g5a57b48fdfcb #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: Ignore frags from uninitialized peer in dp.
When max virtual ap interfaces are configured in all the bands with
ACS and hostapd restart is done every 60s, a crash is observed at
random times.
In this certain scenario, a fragmented packet is received for
self peer, for which rx_tid and rx_frags are not initialized in
datapath. While handling this fragment, crash is observed as the
rx_frag list is uninitialised and when we walk in
ath11k_dp_rx_h_sort_frags, skb null leads to exception.
To address this, before processing received fragments we check
dp_setup_done flag is set to ensure that peer has completed its
dp peer setup for fragment queue, else ignore processing the
fragments.
Call trace:
ath11k_dp_process_rx_err+0x550/0x1084 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x70/0x370 [ath11k]
0xffffffc009693a04
__napi_poll+0x30/0xa4
net_rx_action+0x118/0x270
__do_softirq+0x10c/0x244
irq_exit+0x64/0xb4
__handle_domain_irq+0x88/0xac
gic_handle_irq+0x74/0xbc
el1_irq+0xf0/0x1c0
arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x18
do_idle+0x104/0x248
cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x64
rest_init+0xd0/0xdc
arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14
start_kernel+0x480/0x4b8
Code: f9400281 f94066a2 91405021 b94a0023 (f9406401)
Tested-on: IPQ8074 hw2.0 AHB WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix potential kgd_mem UAFs
kgd_mem pointers returned by kfd_process_device_translate_handle are
only guaranteed to be valid while p->mutex is held. As soon as the mutex
is unlocked, another thread can free the BO. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ses: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in ses_enclosure_data_process()
A fix for:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ses_enclosure_data_process+0x949/0xe30 [ses]
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88a1b043a451 by task systemd-udevd/3271
Checking after (and before in next loop) addl_desc_ptr[1] is sufficient, we
expect the size to be sanitized before first access to addl_desc_ptr[1].
Make sure we don't walk beyond end of page. |
